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INTRODUCTION 
Surrogate motherhood has now been practiced in the United States and 
internationally for over thirty years.1 Thousands of children have been born of 
surrogate mothers worldwide and only a minute percentage wind up in litigation or 
result in serious disputes.2 The process of surrogate motherhood provides many 
                                                                                                                 
 
 † Copyright © 2013 Pamela Laufer-Ukeles. 
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law; J.D., Harvard 
Law School; B.A., Columbia College, Columbia University. The author would like to thank 
the University of Dayton School of Law for its generous funding of this research project and 
for the University of Dayton Faculty Colloquium participants for their questions, comments, 
and support. I would also like to thank the participants in the 2012 “Baby Markets” 
Conference at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law for their helpful and thorough 
feedback. Special thanks to Richard Storrow, June Carbone, Eric Chaffee, Michele Gillman, 
Judith Daar, I. Glenn Cohen, Ellen Waldman, Rhadika Rao, Lisa Ikemoto, and Jody Lyneé 
Madeira for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this article. 
 1. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to 
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 851 (2000). “The earliest 
reported contemporary surrogate mother case is generally agreed to have been in 1980.” R.J. 
Edelmann, Surrogacy: The Psychological Issues, 22 J. REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 123, 
125 (2004). Of course, there are a number of Biblical instances of surrogacy as well; 
although, those instances are closer to surrogate wives then surrogate motherhood. See 
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Gestation: Work for Hire or the Essence of Motherhood? A 
Comparative Legal Analysis, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 91, 120 (2002). 
 2. See Natalie Gamble & Louisa Ghevaert, Surrogacy, Parenthood and Disputes: Are 
There Any Lessons To Be Learned?, BIONEWS (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.bionews.org.uk/
page_89334.asp; Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women 
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infertile couples with genetically related children; it is a service that is highly 
valued and in demand.3 Surrogacy also allows homosexual couples to have 
genetically related children and can assist a single man to start a genetic family. As 
one scholar has noted, a once-maligned process is now largely accepted across the 
political and feminist spectrum.4 
Still, the arguments for and against commercial surrogacy have created a 
whirlwind of agitation. Advocates intuitively embrace the practical solutions 
surrogacy provides for couples and individuals who seek to procreate but are 
inhibited by infertility or limitations of nature in the context of homosexual 
couples.5 Empirical studies of commercial surrogacy have largely concluded that 
surrogates and commissioning couples are satisfied and enriched by the process.6 In 
addition, the narratives of success and fulfillment that abound in the media and 
even in academic literature are powerful testimonies in favor of surrogacy. When 
the end is relieving suffering and fulfilling longing for family and children, 
utilitarian practical justifications weigh strongly in favor of surrogacy when 
participants are able and willing.7 Principled theoretical justifications are also 
offered to support advocates’ positions: advocates support the autonomy and power 
it provides to commissioning and intended parents as well as to surrogates who 
choose to engage in these arrangements for compensation.8 Advocates view the 
                                                                                                                 
or a Commodification of Women’s Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 113, 130 
(1997) (“The cases illustrated thus far demonstrate that conflicts over custody of a child born 
through surrogacy have been minimal.”); Karen Synesiou, Surrogacy: Myths and Realities, 
MOTHERINGINTHEMIDDLE.COM (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.motheringinthemiddle.com/
?tag=karen-synesiou. But see, e.g., S.N. v. M.B., 188 Ohio App. 3d 324, 333, 2010-Ohio-2479, 
935 N.E.2d 463, 470 (10th Dist.) (holding that Ohio’s Parentage Act applies to any parentage 
determination, including surrogacy cases), cause dismissed, 126 Ohio St. 3d 1525, 2010-Ohio-
3583, 931 N.E.2d 126. 
 3. In this Article, I consider commercial surrogacy. Altruistic unpaid surrogacy is also 
practiced but it is not the subject of this Article. Some countries, such as Canada and the 
United Kingdom, prohibit commercial surrogacy but allow unpaid surrogacy. See Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act, 1985, c. 49, § 1A (U.K.), inserted by Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 36(1) (U.K.); Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, 
c. 2, § 6(1) (Can.). 
 4. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 137–44 (2009). 
 5. See, e.g., Susan Donaldson James, More Gay Men Choose Surrogacy to Have 
Children, ABC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/OnCall/
story?id=4439567&page=1.  
 6. See infra Part I.A. 
 7. See, e.g., Emily Gelmann, “I’m Just the Oven, It’s Totally Their Bun”: The Power 
and Necessity of the Federal Government to Regulate Commercial Gestational Surrogacy 
Arrangements and Protect the Legal Rights of Intended Parents, 32 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 
159 (2011) (couching the need to legalize surrogacy in the context of helping to fulfill 
couples procreative desires); Catherine London, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused Model of 
Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 391 (2012).  
 8. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, in 
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 167 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990); JOHN A. 
ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
130–32 (1994); CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY passim (1989) 
(arguing that permitting surrogacy supports women’s autonomy over their bodies); John 
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rejection of surrogacy as reactive and anti-technological because it denies important 
practical benefits to people searching to fulfill procreative desires.9 
In the opposing camp, many have reacted with hostility and outrage to a 
contractual arrangement that commercializes women’s gestational services.10 Such 
deontological arguments point to theoretical and conceptual concerns despite 
practical benefits. Anti-surrogacy advocacy by feminists, social conservatives, and 
others has led to the banning of the practice in a number of states in the United 
States and countries worldwide.11 Such opposition is sometimes coupled with 
opposition to other fertility treatments such as egg and sperm donation and in vitro 
fertilization more generally, but it is also often targeted specifically at surrogate 
motherhood as an outlier among other fertility treatments.12 Arguments against 
                                                                                                                 
Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for 
Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 383 (1991); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive 
Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. 
L. REV. 297, 309. There are also claims that U.S. citizens have a procreative right to use 
surrogacy. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the State’s Burden of Proof 
in Regulating Noncoital Reproduction, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD, supra, at 24, 25–27. 
But, the constitutional right to privacy in coital reproduction does not likely extend to 
surrogacy. See Garrison, supra note 1, at 857; Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Approaching 
Surrogate Motherhood, 26 VT. L. REV. 407, 413–14 (2002). 
 9. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby 
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978); Gelmann, supra note 7, at 161 (citing Ruby L. Lee, 
Note, New Trends in Global Outsourcing of Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation, 
20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 275, 286 (2009) (describing the failure to provide regulation to 
permit surrogacy as a problem of legal conservatism: the “[l]aws have not kept pace with 
advancing growth in reproductive technologies.”)); London, supra note 7, at 393 (“This 
discussion is intended to invite a broader dialogue within feminist jurisprudence and the 
legal community and to advance the notion that the law should facilitate, rather than inhibit, 
procreative advancements.”) (citing Shultz, supra note 8, at 303 (“By embracing the 
emerging opportunities provided by advancing technology, the law would enhance 
individual freedom, fulfillment and responsibility.”)). 
 10. See MARTHA FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988); CHRISTINE OVERALL, 
HUMAN REPRODUCTION: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, POLICIES (1993); JANICE G. RAYMOND, 
WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN’S 
FREEDOM (1993); BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND 
TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY (1989); Anita L. Allen, The Black Surrogate 
Mother, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 17 (1991) (raising racial concerns connected with the use 
of surrogacy and advocating alternately for a ban on surrogate contracts or refusal to enforce 
surrogate contracts); Katherine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 
333–34 (1998); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1928–
36 (1987); Scott, supra note 4, at 130–37 (recounting feminists and social conservatives’ 
objections to surrogate motherhood around the time of In re Baby M). 
 11. Australia, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, 
Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, and some U.S. states ban surrogacy altogether; Brazil, 
Israel, and the U.K. use tight restrictions to regulate surrogacy. See, e.g., Karen Busby & 
Delaney Vun, Revisiting The Handmaid’s Tale: Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research 
on Surrogate Mothers, 26 CANADIAN J. FAM. L. 13, 32–36 (2010); Laufer-Ukeles, supra 
note 1, at 98–104; Amrita Pande, Commercial Surrogacy in India: Manufacturing a Perfect 
Mother-Worker, 35 SIGNS 969, 972 (2010). 
 12. See J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 13 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2004) (“Those states that 
make surrogacy (e.g., paid surrogacy or baby selling) expressly illegal are Delaware, Iowa, 
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surrogate motherhood characterize the practice as child-selling, improperly 
commodifying human life,13 exploitative,14 patriarchal, and unable to be validly 
contracted for under doctrines of consent.15 Others are against technology that 
expands and complicates natural families.16 Mostly, the opposition is not focused 
on the actual practice of surrogacy or the individual surrogates and intended 
couples involved but on the overall process as being contestable on conceptual 
grounds. 
Thus, in an often-asymmetric manner, deontological theoretical concerns go 
head-to-head with practical utilitarian benefits in a manner that creates dissociation 
and tension. No matter how prescient and compelling the ethical concerns brought 
forward by critics, advocates focused on the relief to suffering that surrogacy 
provides are unlikely to be swayed and vice versa. How do we reconcile these 
strongly contrasting positions? Is there any way to incorporate both sides of the 
debate into a coherent singular vision? Can one take seriously normative concerns 
while recognizing practical benefits? While there is no one-size-fits-all solution to 
the surrogacy dilemma, this Article attempts to create a framework in which both 
utilitarian and deontological principles are relevant. 
What makes surrogate motherhood so difficult to navigate is that it is a 
transaction in commercial intimacy, and it is hard to take account of commerciality 
and intimacy simultaneously.17 Many commercial transactions in intimacy are 
banned or highly regulated.18 In surrogacy, a service is provided for money 
involving a biological, physical, and emotional relationship that develops between 
the surrogate and fetus as well as with the intended parents.19 Surrogacy involves 
procreation of a child and rights to motherhood, not normally commercial 
subjects.20 Empirical studies support accounts of surrogacy as an intimate 
relationship in which attachments and emotional relationships are formed, if not 
                                                                                                                 
Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Utah, Washington D.C. and Wisconsin. 
Surrogacy is exempt from criminal baby selling statutes in Iowa, Alabama and Washington. 
Those states that ban surrogacy contracts are Arizona, Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, New 
Jersey, North Dakota and Tennessee.”). 
 13. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1241, 1244–45 (N.J. 1988); Jennifer 
Damelio & Kelly Sorensen, Enhancing Autonomy in Paid Surrogacy, 22 BIOETHICS 269, 270 
(2008); Radin, supra note 10, at 1930–36. 
 14. See, e.g., Ruth Macklin, Is There Anything Wrong with Surrogate Motherhood: An 
Ethical Analysis, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD, supra note 8, at 136, 141–42; CHRISTINE 
OVERALL, ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 118, 124–26 (1987); 
Janice G. Raymond, Reproductive Gifts and Gift Giving: The Altruistic Woman, HASTINGS 
CTR. REP., Nov.–Dec. 1990, at 7, 11. 
 15. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Baby M and the Question of Parenthood, 76 GEO. L.J. 
1811, 1816–1820 (1988). 
 16. See, e.g., PHYLLIS CHESLER, SACRED BOND: THE LEGACY OF BABY M 34 (1988). 
 17. By “commercial intimacy,” I refer to monetary payment for intimate services, 
comparable to payments for sex, body parts, and children. See infra Part I.B. 
 18. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. The sale of organs is banned and 
prostitution is usually illegal, as is baby-selling. See also infra note 70 and accompanying 
text. See infra notes 114–23 and accompanying text for a discussion of transactions in 
intimacy and when such transactions are most problematic. 
 19. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 20. See infra Part I.B.2. 
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with the fetus directly than with the commissioning parents.21 As an empirical and 
emotional reality, surrogates are vulnerable to the contractual control and relational 
desires of the more protected and powerful commissioning parents.22 The 
relational, intimate aspects of surrogacy are real and can cause real harms to 
surrogates and society more broadly.23 The intimacy involved should not be 
ignored for the sake of fulfilling anyone’s procreative desires. Yet, money is also 
integral; without it the transaction would not occur. Money provides appropriate 
and valuable compensation for the difficult work of surrogates. And the benefits of 
surrogacy are real and compelling, as described above.24 
The straightforward way to approach such a transaction is either to focus on the 
intimacy involved in the transaction—motherhood, relationships, children, and the 
potential for exploitation—or to focus on the benefits of the commerciality for 
commissioning parents as well as surrogates. Depending on which perspective is 
more intuitive or serves one’s purposes will determine whether surrogacy is 
something shunned or embraced. If the focus is on motherhood and the transfer of 
children, opposition is intuitive. If the focus is on the way in which commerciality 
can solve problems of fertility and empower women, support is likely. In this 
Article, I argue that a myopic focus on either the concerns of intimacy or on the 
benefits of commerciality is problematic. Rather, the appropriate way to consider 
surrogacy is to recognize both its commercial benefits and intimate concerns not as 
a compromise position, but as a prescriptive, normative framework for regulation. 
In particular, in the context of the transaction in commercial intimacy I explore, 
I focus on the vulnerability of the surrogate and take seriously her right to human 
dignity in the context of allowing the commercial transaction in surrogacy. The 
surrogate woman, her body, and the relationships she forms with the fetus she 
gestates and the commissioning couple who invites her into the most intimate parts 
of their lives must be imbued with human dignity, understanding, and ethical 
significance. Regulation must work to prevent the surrogate and the relationships 
she forms as means to an end—the baby. Yet, the surrogacy process need not by its 
essence subvert the humanity of its participants. Moreover, regulation should 
respect the commercial nature of the transaction that provides a necessary (if not 
primary) incentive for creating the commercial surrogate relationships and 
empowers surrogate workers.25 It is my contention that regulation that 
appropriately reflects the intimate and commercial aspects of the relationship can 
protect the intimacy and promote the benefits of the commercial process while 
empowering and protecting the surrogate worker. I argue that in transactions of 
commercial intimacy such as surrogate motherhood, regulation should be 
formulated that respects the benefits of the commercial transaction while taking 
seriously the relational intimacy and potential exploitation involved in surrogate 
motherhood. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. See infra Part I.A. 
 22. See infra Part I.B.5. 
 23. See infra Part I.B.5. 
 24. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text for a discussion of incentives 
propelling surrogates to engage in commercial transactions. 
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This Article will proceed in three Parts. In the first Part, I provide a framework 
for exploring the appropriate legal and ethical response to surrogate motherhood. 
To do so, I first examine empirical sociological and anthropological studies that 
demonstrate the complex intimate and commercial nature of these transactions. 
Such studies put into stark contrast the benefits provided and satisfaction enabled 
by surrogacy, the vulnerabilities and expectations of surrogates, and, practically, 
the ways such surrogates can best be protected. I then rely on theories of mixed 
commodification and relational autonomy to create a legal and ethical framework 
for contemplating, and guidelines for assessing, how best to contend with 
surrogacy. I describe the theory of mixed commodification and how it can be used 
to recognize both the nonmonetizable, emotional aspects of surrogacy as well as the 
more practical and beneficial financial arrangement that is undergone. I consider 
how intimacy coexists with commercialization within surrogate motherhood, and I 
will advocate for a regulatory framework that accounts for both the financial, 
contractual aspects of the arrangements and the personal, intimate relationships. 
Thus, I not only view mixed commodification as a descriptive reality but as a 
normative imperative for reflecting the reality, concerns, and benefits of surrogate 
contracts. I will also consider the theoretical approach of relational autonomy, 
which marks autonomy as potentially compromised in any situation—autonomy is 
not a yes or no condition. While surrogacy raises concerns about exploitation and 
diminished autonomy, there is no imperative to prohibit surrogacy on that basis. 
Rather, a regulatory approach should be used to optimize autonomy by recognizing 
circumstances, conditions, and surrounding relationships. 
In the second Part, under the framework of this nuanced approach, I provide 
justification for a regulated system for domestic, state-based surrogate motherhood 
agreements. In particular, I argue that regulation that recognizes the kin-like 
emotional attachments that are built between surrogates and intentional parents by 
providing the possibility of postbirth contact between surrogates and the babies 
they gestate can validate and protect surrogate’s work. Moreover, regulation that 
promotes autonomy through counseling, psychological evaluations, and a clear 
provision of information can promote autonomous decision making. On the whole, 
I believe in formulating regulation that allows surrogacy to continue to be practiced 
but in a manner that appropriately reflects the commercial and intimate nature of 
the transaction. And, the legal recognition of such intimacy corresponds with the 
general movement in family law towards recognizing intimate care relationships 
that do not necessarily correlate with traditional formal relationships. 
In the third Part, I tackle the thorny problem of international surrogacy. 
Domestic surrogacy is of limited relevance, particularly if it is restricted through 
regulation; the new frontier in surrogacy is the hiring of foreign surrogates, and the 
question of how to consider and address such arrangements is pressing. Indeed, 
under precisely the same framework and based on the same normative concerns and 
empirical data, international surrogacy arrangements are cause for greater 
concern.26 As I will demonstrate, the manner in which domestic regulations can 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. I use the term “international surrogacy” to denote the use of foreign surrogates that 
live in a different country than the commissioning couple or intended parents. Others also 
use the term “transnational surrogacy.” See, e.g., Jennifer S. Hendricks, Not of Woman Born: 
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recognize and organize the intimate and commercial aspects of surrogacy cannot be 
applied effectively in the international arena. In the context of international 
surrogacy, the concerns regarding commodification and exploitation are most 
pronounced and the empirical data most undermines the advisability of the process. 
Most pressing, the support and regulatory framework I argue are necessary to 
protect intimate relationships in domestic surrogacy are not practical or relevant in 
international surrogacy. And, conditions that raise concerns about how intimate 
work can exploit surrogate mothers are much more pronounced for foreign 
surrogates. Thus, I argue that while recognizing the concerns of intimacy and the 
benefits of commerciality can be formed into a normative framework for domestic 
surrogacy, such a system cannot be readily translated overseas. 
Given the more problematic nature of international surrogacy as I describe it, the 
question that follows is what can be done in response. I propose that states 
providing a regulatory regime for domestic surrogacy should also consider effects 
of regulations on international surrogacy. Ruling out the possibility of criminalizing 
or denying citizenship to children of international surrogacy, I suggest that 
countries of commissioning couples attempt to disincentivize the use of 
international arrangements. I outline possible administrative procedures and foreign 
policy initiatives that could be put into place to encourage interested 
commissioning couples to use domestic surrogates in lieu of foreign surrogates. 
In sum, this Article makes three contributions to the existing literature on 
surrogacy. First, I propose a mixed commodification and relational autonomy 
conceptual framework for regulating commercial surrogacy as the most appropriate 
reflection of the nature of the transaction. Under this framework, I argue that 
commercial surrogacy should be allowed to flourish as long as the intimacy 
involved is also recognized by taking relationships among the surrogate, fetus, and 
commissioning couple seriously and optimizing autonomy from a contextual 
perspective. Second, I propose regulatory provisions that recognize the concerns of 
intimacy as well as benefits of commerciality. Third, by examining the conditions 
of international surrogacy, I argue that this framework for recognizing intimacy is 
not transferable to surrogate relationships with foreign surrogates. A foreign 
surrogate is not just a surrogate living in a different locale; it is an entirely more 
commercial, less intimate, and more problematic method of baby making. 
I. FRAMEWORK FOR CONSIDERING THE COMPLEX NATURE OF SURROGATE 
MOTHERHOOD 
To shed light on what can and should be done to balance the benefits and 
drawbacks of surrogacy, I will first describe the complex nature of surrogate 
motherhood arrangements as outlined and analyzed in empirical, anthropological, 
and sociological studies that capture the intimate relational and commercial aspects 
of the engagement. I will then lean on notions of mixed commodification and 
relational autonomy in order to provide a legal and ethical framework for 
considering surrogacy. No single noncomplex principle such as autonomy, 
                                                                                                                 
A Scientific Fantasy, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 399, 438 (2011); Barbara Stark, 
Transnational Surrogacy and International Human Rights Law, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 369 (2012). 
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exploitation, patriarchy, or procreative freedom can resolve these disputes. Rather, 
nuanced perspectives should take into account the complex nature of the 
transaction. I will develop these complex perspectives in this Part and then, in Parts 
II and III, I will apply the frameworks developed in the context of domestic and 
international surrogacy to suggest appropriate legal action. 
A. Describing the Complex Surrogate Transaction: Results of Empirical, 
Sociological, and Anthropological Studies 
Empirical studies, which have sought to track the realities, concerns, and overall 
experiences of surrogate mothers and intended parents, have coalesced around a 
number of basic and important findings. Such findings should inform the way we 
think about surrogate motherhood. While empirical studies have not been as 
numerous as one might have predicted given the onslaught of controversy and 
discussion surrounding surrogacy,27 a reasonable stockpile of empirical data has 
been compiled since 1983 when surrogacy emerged as a fertility option.28 What is 
striking about these empirical findings is their consistency.29 
One particularly salient finding is that the vast majority of surrogate mothers do 
not attest to bonding with the babies they gestate to the extent that many predicted 
and was evident in the case of Baby M.30 While most surrogates assert that parting 
with the baby is a difficult separation, it does not appear to be as traumatic as 
expected. 31 Indeed, given the thousands of surrogacy contracts that are entered into 
each year, “‘the lack of litigation is remarkable.’”32 When asked, surrogate mothers 
do not generally indicate that the babies belong to them; rather, they feel they are 
providing a meaningful and valuable service for the intended parents.33 While this 
appears to be true for both gestational and traditional surrogates,34 it seems 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. See Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: An 
Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 21, 22–24 (2005) 
(reporting twenty-seven empirical studies from January 1983–December 2003). 
 28. See infra Part I.A. 
 29. See, e.g., Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 27, at 29. Of course, there are always 
outliers that may not fit into the overall finding that I outline in this section. But my 
generalizations in this section are based on the findings of the studies that I cite in this 
Article. 
 30. In the case of In re Baby M, the traditional surrogate mother did not want to give the 
child to the intended parents. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d. 1227, 1235–40 (N.J. 1988). See Olga 
B.A. van den Akker, Psychological Trait and State Characteristics, Social Support and 
Attitudes to the Surrogate Pregnancy and Baby, 22 HUM. REP. 2287, 2293–94 (2007); Eric 
Blyth, “I Wanted To Be Interesting. I Wanted To Be Able to Say ‘I’ve Done Something 
Interesting with My Life’”: Interviews with Surrogate Mothers in Britain, 12 J. REPROD. & 
INFANT PSYCHOL. 189, 195–96 (1994); Susan Fischer & Irene Gillman, Surrogate 
Motherhood: Attachment, Attitudes and Social Support, PSYCHIATRY, Feb. 1991, at 13, 16. 
 31. See, e.g., J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, The Children of Baby M., 39 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 345, 357 (2011). 
 32. Id. at 356 (citation omitted). 
 33. See Edelmann, supra note 1, at 130; Fischer & Gillman, supra note 30, at 17; see 
also KRISTY STEVENS & EMMA DALLY, SURROGATE MOTHER: ONE WOMAN’S STORY (1985). 
 34. Traditional surrogates are both genetic and gestational mothers of the fetus; 
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especially true for gestational surrogates who do not have a genetic connection to 
the fetus.35 Gestational surrogates report to heavily emphasize genetics and 
consider the baby in the womb to be someone else’s based on genetic affiliation.36 
Whether or not one believes that genetic affiliation between intended parents and 
the baby does or should make a significant difference in the permissibility of 
surrogacy or in identifying legal motherhood, studies suggest that the lack of 
genetic affiliation matters to gestational surrogates (but apparently not to traditional 
surrogates)37 and facilitates the process for them.38 
Instead of the close bond that researchers expected surrogates to develop with 
the baby, the predicted emotional connection seems to be forming between the 
surrogate mother and the commissioning couple.39 As pregnancy lasts nine months 
and prenatal care can be intensive and involved, it is the long-term engagement 
between surrogate and intended parents that studies indicate create emotional bonds 
reflecting the very intimate nature of the agreement.40 Surrogates and intended 
parents tend to experience the pregnancy and labor together and become 
emotionally and intimately involved in each other’s daily lives and relationships.41 
It has been described by researchers as more than just a “commonplace friendship” 
                                                                                                                 
gestational surrogates do not have a genetic connection to the fetus. See infra Part II.B.1 
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Surrogacy, 21 J. REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 145, 147 (2003) [hereinafter van den Akker, 
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 36. See, e.g., ELLY TEMAN, BIRTHING A MOTHER: THE SURROGATE BODY AND THE 
PREGNANT SELF 31–68 (2010) (describing in great detail her in depth interviews with more 
than twenty-six gestational surrogates and over forty-three intended families over a period of 
eight years); Hal B. Levine, Gestational Surrogacy: Nature and Culture in Kinship, 
ETHNOLOGY, Summer 2003, at 173, 175. 
 37. See, e.g., Olga B. A. van den Akker, A Longitudinal Pre-Pregnancy to Post-
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Confidence and Genealogy, 26 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 277, 281 
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of Surrogacy, supra note 35, at 151 (demonstrating how a majority of gestational surrogates 
but not genetic surrogates believe in the importance of a genetic link). 
 38. See supra note 37; see also van den Akker, Longitudinal Comparison, supra note 
37, at 282 (reporting that gestational surrogates relied on lack of genetic affiliation to 
facilitate process). 
 39. See, e.g., TEMAN, supra note 36, at 142–47, 205–29; Hazel Baslington, The Social 
Organization of Surrogacy: Relinquishing a Baby and the Role of Payment in the 
Psychological Detachment Process, 7 J. HEALTH PSYCHOL. 57, 58, 64–67 (2002) (describing 
his thesis of maternal-fetal detachment during commercial surrogacy and noting the strong 
relationships developed with infertile couples using the concept of “deflection”); Melinda M. 
Hohman & Christina B. Hagan, Satisfaction with Surrogate Mothering: A Relational Model, 
4 J. HUM. BEHAV. SOC. ENV’T 61, 67–69, 81–82 (2001); Helena Ragoné, Chasing the Blood 
Tie: Surrogate Mothers, Adoptive Mothers and Fathers, 23 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 352, 359–62 
(1996). 
 40. See TEMAN, supra note 36, at 142–47, 205–29; Baslington, supra note 39, at 66–67; 
Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at 67–69, 81–82; Ragoné, supra note 39, at 359–62. 
 41. See TEMAN, supra note 36, at 142–47, 205–29; Baslington, supra note 39, at 66; 
Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at 67–69, 81–82; Ragoné, supra note 39, at 359–62. 
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but rather a relationship deeply intertwined with the welfare of the child and based 
on the intimacy of the pregnancy.42 In fact, many studies show that it is the 
relationship between intended mother and surrogate that is the strongest—it is 
compared to a joint mothering experience.43 Indeed, in an extreme circumstance a 
surrogate expressed becoming so attached to the intended parents that they refused 
payment for a second surrogacy arrangement.44 Moreover, many describe postbirth 
relationships that continue between the adults, which involve but are not 
necessarily focused on the baby.45 Indeed, it is this bond between the surrogate and 
the intended parents that appears difficult to erase after the birth of the baby and 
that may cause emotional heartache as well as logistical and legal complications.46 
Surrogates attest that the relationship with intended parents is an important 
aspect of the surrogacy arrangements.47 When relationships are good, many 
surrogates express a high level of contentment with the process post birth.48 They 
are most satisfied with the process when they develop a connection with intended 
parents whom they feel appreciate their important contribution in helping them to 
create a family.49 The more such feelings are returned, and the better the relations 
between surrogate and intended parents, the better the surrogate tends to feel about 
her experience and the lower the level of distress or exploitations she reports. 
Empirical studies demonstrate that when surrogates feel that the intended parents 
are distant and that the level of relationship did not meet their expectations the 
surrogates are likely to express dissatisfaction with the process.50 In fact, 
disappointed expectations about relationships correlate closely with surrogates’ 
dissatisfaction with the surrogacy process.51 
The nature of this relationship with the intended parents that is experienced and 
expected by many surrogates is complex and potentially long lasting. In the short 
term, many surrogates contend that it is important to see the child born of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. Edelmann, supra note 1, at 129 (citing Blyth, supra note 30). 
 43. See, e.g., TEMAN, supra note 36, at 110–79; Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at 
67–69; Ragoné, supra note 39, at 359–62. 
 44. See TEMAN, supra note 36, at 209 (describing the case of a surrogate who refused 
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 45. See id. at 221–25 (focus of relationship is with intended mother); Baslington, supra 
note 39, at 66 (focus of relationship is with the couple); Edelmann, supra note 1, at 129; 
Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at 69–70. 
 46. See TEMAN, supra note 36, at 221–29; Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at 67–69; 
Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 27, at 31–32. 
 47. See, e.g., TEMAN, supra note 36, at 110–34; Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at 
67–69. 
 48. TEMAN, supra note 36, at 215–25; Baslington, supra note 39, at 65–67; Ciccarelli & 
Beckman, supra note 27, at 32 (“[I]t is the quality of the relationship with the couple that 
largely determines the surrogate mother’s satisfaction with her experience.”); DiFonzo & 
Stern, supra note 31, at 358–59; Hohman & Hogan, supra note 39, at 67–69. 
 49. Baslington, supra note 39, at 66; Hohman & Hagen, supra note 39, at 67–69. 
 50. See, e.g., TEMAN, supra note 36, at 205–21; Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at 
67–69. 
 51. See, e.g., TEMAN, supra note 36, at 205–21; Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at 
67–69. 
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agreement and to be acknowledged by the new family during and after the birth.52 
But, overall, surrogates’ expectations appear to be that the relationship will last 
well past the birth, perhaps in perpetuity. Indeed, according to relevant studies, it is 
important to surrogates that these relationships that form during the pregnancy do 
not terminate suddenly and drastically when the child is born and transferred to the 
intended parents.53 Surprisingly, satisfaction with the process can be negatively 
influenced even if the relationship was good during the pregnancy but then tapers 
off after the birth.54 Most surrogate mothers, and especially the ones who are 
particularly satisfied with the process, report continued relationships and contact 
with the commissioning couple for years after the birth.55 Thus, it is not only the 
relationship that is important to surrogates during the time of the agreement, but it 
is important for them to feel an emotional connection well past that timeframe. The 
surrogate wants to feel that the relationship that developed during the pregnancy 
with the intended couple is real and meaningful and that it will last—that it was not 
just a time-limited contract exchanging payment for services, but that a real 
emotional bond developed that went beyond an exchange of money for a 
pregnancy. 
Many surrogates express that they want to feel appreciated and thanked for their 
investment in time and effort beyond receiving payment.56 While they work for 
money, many surrogates express altruistic motives as well, and no amount of 
money could fully compensate women for the level of commitment they must 
make.57 In describing their work, surrogate narratives use concepts of “gift-giving” 
and “mission” to accentuate the more altruistic side of their endeavors and to 
deemphasize the commercial contractual nature of their work.58 Evidence suggests 
that surrogates want to be acknowledged for the altruistic aspects of their actions as 
well as paid for the commercial aspects. 
In sum, studies indicate that surrogates go through an intense emotional and 
physical process for the intended parents and want their work to be acknowledged 
and valued. Moreover, relationships that develop during the course of the forty-
week pregnancy with commissioning couples matter to surrogates; surrogates want 
the relationships to have meaning. If surrogates do not feel appreciated and 
connected to the intended parents beyond the birth, they often feel used and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. TEMAN, supra note 36, at 205–21. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., TEMAN, supra note 36, at 225–29; Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 27, at 
32. 
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CHANGING MEN, WOMEN, AND THE WORLD 136 (2007); TEMAN, supra note 36, at 205–35. 
 57. See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text. 
 58. Amrita Pande, Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India: Gifts for Global 
Sisters?, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 618, 619 (2011); see TEMAN, supra note 36, at 
205–33, passim. 
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discarded.59 This attests to the ways that surrogacy transcends a mere job for hire. 
Surrogates work for money, but many surrogates attest that the investment they 
make in carrying the fetus is extremely physically and emotionally involved and 
that they want the nature of this relationship appreciated and recognized. These 
empirical studies are important for the picture of surrogacy they paint, which is 
quite different from the concerns about exploitation and trauma than many 
predicted. In particular, they demonstrate that there are indeed emotional bonds 
formed during surrogacy that transcend the contractual agreement and that these 
emotional bonds are between adults rather than with the fetus the surrogate carries 
and the baby she births. 
Another important empirical finding is that, generally, surrogate mothers, when 
working for commissioning couples domestically within the United States, Europe, 
and Israel, are not members of an underclass faced with poverty particularly 
susceptible to exploitation but rather are generally working-class women.60 In the 
United States and Europe, they are also usually Caucasian, Christian, and in their 
late twenties and early thirties.61 They usually have high school and not 
infrequently some college education.62 While surrogates are generally in a lower 
economic class than intended parents, they are not usually in desperate positions.63 
It is possible that poor, more vulnerable women are screened out by surrogacy 
agencies and commissioning couples,64 but the availability of educated, financially 
stable women for surrogacy is instructive. Studies also demonstrate that surrogates 
often have multiple children themselves and use the money to supplement family 
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Longitudinal Comparison, supra note 37, at 278–79. 
 63. See, e.g., DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 31, at 357 (“Research shows that although 
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intended parents that employ them.”). 
 64. See, e.g., Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 27, at 31. 
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income while staying home to raise children or working part-time.65 In particular, 
military wives, who move too much to hold down steady jobs but have good health 
benefits, use the opportunity to surrogate in order to double their household income 
while raising small children.66 
Thus, feminist predictions that gestational surrogacy would lead to a situation in 
which poor, uneducated women would be used and controlled in an undignified 
manner have not materialized.67 This is true at least in domestic surrogacy 
arrangements in the United States, Europe, and Israel, locales in which these 
studies have been conducted.68 This is an important finding for determining the 
level of exploitation and autonomy that may be involved. Contrary to many 
predictions, there are educated women who do have other choices for earning 
money and supporting themselves and their families who seem to prefer surrogacy 
to other job choices and even enjoy the process. Indeed, the author has met a 
physician who served as a surrogate to a younger, less educated woman to whom 
she was not related. While such instances are relatively rare, the fact that they occur 
is informative. 
B. Mixed Commodification: Mothering for Money 
The way to make sense of the tension between ethical concerns regarding 
protecting vulnerability and the satisfaction expressed for the practical benefits of 
commercial surrogacy is by exploring and recognizing the complex nature of the 
controversial transaction, which is also a relationship. Commercial surrogacy is 
both deeply intimate and a market transaction. This deep intimacy emanates from 
the nature of pregnancy, its duration, and its biological impact on the baby and the 
gestating woman.69 Yet, money is an essential part of the transaction, providing due 
compensation for extremely hard work, relieving suffering for infertile couples, 
and, for the most part, engendering satisfied partnerships between commissioning 
couples and surrogate mothers. In this Part, I will first broadly outline the physical 
and emotional intimacy of surrogacy reflected in the empirical studies described 
above and the potential harms such intimacy creates when part of a market 
transaction. The commercial aspects of paid surrogacy are clear as are benefits to 
the intended parents and the monetary benefits to the surrogate. But, the intimate 
aspects and the harms of commodification of such intimacy should be clarified. 
Then, I will describe the theoretical perspective of mixed commodification that best 
reflects and explains the complexity of surrogate motherhood. I will then move 
                                                                                                                 
 
 65. DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 31, at 357–58. 
 66. See id. at 358. 
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from theory to practice, arguing for the need to regulate commercial surrogacy due 
to the intimacy involved while recognizing the simultaneous need to allow 
surrogacy to exist in the market to provide valuable services to commissioning 
couples and valid labor choices for surrogates. Finally, I will consider some 
criticisms of mixed commodification and its application to the legal context and 
discuss why such criticisms do not undermine the propriety of regulating 
commercial intimacy. 
1. Physical and Emotional Intimacy of Surrogacy 
An ongoing concern with surrogacy is the problem of commercializing the 
intimate process of gestation. Such intimacy coupled with the invaluable benefit it 
provides to commissioning couples is what I posit fosters the struggle around 
legalizing commercial surrogacy. Commercializing pregnancy in surrogate 
motherhood creates a transaction in intimacy for physical, biological, and 
emotional processes. This intimacy is clarified and expanded upon in the empirical 
studies outlined above. While the purchase of intimacy does occur in other 
contexts, it is usually regulated, is often banned, and is always fraught with 
concerns.70 
The nature of the intimacy in surrogate motherhood can be described on a 
number of interlocking levels. First, surrogate agreements involve a long-lasting 
and intense involvement in the bodily integrity of the surrogate. Surrogate contracts 
assert control over the lives of surrogates while they gestate; their body is literally 
being used for someone else’s purposes in a constant and inseparable manner. 
There is no going home at the end of the day; there are no breaks and one cannot 
really quit or get a new job without complete upheaval and the suffering involved 
in undergoing an abortion.71 Once a pregnancy is initiated, surrogates are literally 
trapped, physically, into their agreements and into their entangled relationship with 
intentional parents.72 Moreover, commissioning parents are interested in and can 
even assert control over the daily actions of the surrogate.73 Surrogacy contracts 
may prevent surrogates from international travel or participation in high impact 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. See infra Part I.B.2 for a general discussion of the concerns raised by 
commercializing intimacy. See also Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 493–96 (2005). 
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sports or cigarette smoking, or they may require certain actions and encumber 
surrogates’ freedom generally.74 
Second, from a biological perspective, the physical interconnectedness between 
the fetus and the gestational mother has been well documented, and her actions do 
have effects on the fetus.75 The fetus and surrogate mother share bodily functions, 
physical space, and molecular biology.76 Thus, it is unlikely that intended parents 
can be expected to leave a gestational mother to act in any manner she chooses. 
More fundamentally, the act of gestation is decidedly different from incubation 
from a scientific perspective. Gestation involves a real biological interdependency 
over the course of forty weeks that affects both the fetus and the surrogate and that 
should not be ignored.77 The surrogate is affected on a constant basis by the fetus 
growing inside her and vice versa. 
Finally, as described in empirical studies described above, this physical 
involvement and interrelatedness is coupled with long-lasting emotional 
connections, if not with the fetus, then with the intended parents.78 Such emotional 
connectedness and the humanity involved in these commercial transactions can 
create high-level disputes and suffering. Surrogate mothers have reported feeling 
devastated when their involvement in the process is minimized.79 Gestating a fetus 
may not lead to motherhood,80 but it is also not like building a cabinet. 
Commercializing the singular, long-term nature of the gestational process is 
complex. When human life is changing hands, the nature of these transactions 
should be considered to ensure that the interests of the children and the parties 
involved are being protected. 
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1238 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:1223 
 
2. Harms of Commodification 
Due to the intimacy involved in surrogacy described in detail above, a major 
critique of commercializing surrogacy is that such a market inappropriately 
commodifies the human body as a form of baby selling or as a form of selling 
gestational services.81 As one scholar puts it, by commercializing the womb, “[w]e 
potentially do harm to ourselves and to human flourishing if we treat something 
integral to ourselves as a commodity, that is, as separate and fungible.”82 It is 
argued that commodification of services or things that are self-defining (i.e., 
integral to the self) should not be put on the market because doing so harms 
participants specifically and society broadly.83 These harms include both 
consequentialist and intrinsic concerns regarding the effects of exchanges of body 
parts for money.84 Consequentialist harms refer to specific empirical effects of 
commodification on the value of persons in society and the way persons relate to 
one another; the intrinsic arguments concern the problematic nature of the sale 
itself.85 
It is argued that there is a cost to society in allowing the sale of humans, bodily 
organs, and capacities because we see ourselves as more than mere commodities. 
Allowing ourselves and our body parts to be traded for money forces us to perceive 
ourselves in terms of our own monetary worth. Surrogates thus might view 
themselves and their bodies merely in terms of their saleable worth and not for their 
essential value as part of humanity. Women might then be bought and sold based 
on their worth in surrogacy. Thus, commercializing intimacy is critiqued as 
problematic because selling intimacy compromises the personal and emotional 
nature of that intimacy and treats female body parts not as an end in themselves but 
as a means to an end. 
In addition, it is argued that the intimate nature of the surrogacy relationship 
warrants consideration to protect vulnerable parties from the emotional harm that 
such intimate contracts can cause.86 As one scholar noted, “[t]he commissioning 
couple does not just enter into a contract with the surrogate: they embark on a 
relationship with her.”87 Human emotions, pain and suffering as well as joy, often 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. For a discussion of these alternate ways of viewing the commodification inherent to 
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 87. Id. at 338 (emphasis omitted). 
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revolve around commercial surrogate transactions and can be devastating to 
participants whose expectations are not met.88 
These harms are amorphous and at times overstated, particularly as compared to 
the real financial and procreative benefits involved in commercializing surrogacy. 
However, they are still relevant and intuitive given both are real anathema toward 
selling humans—children, organs and fetuses included—as well as selling love and 
sex and the real effects the sale of human goods can have on the participants. Such 
vulnerabilities and potential harms are reflected in the empirical studies discussed 
above as well as more abstract harms to humanity. Most pointedly, it is the 
emotional and physical vulnerability of the surrogate mother whose humanity cries 
for protection from harm and exploitation and in protection of her human dignity. 
3. The Mixed Commodification Analysis 
If one takes the commodification concerns as described above seriously, the 
only way to make sense of surrogacy as a financial transaction is to recognize the 
complex nature of the transaction that includes both the benefits of 
commercialization to the surrogates and the intended parents and the intimacy 
involved. “Incomplete commodification” was originally coined by Margaret Radin 
to acknowledge that some commodities are monetized, but not entirely.89 Margaret 
Radin asks, can we both know the price of something and simultaneously know 
that it is priceless?90 While Radin recommends incomplete commodification by 
regulating some markets without banning them, such as prostitution,91 she does so 
in the context of struggling with incomplete commodification in order to preserve 
the non-commercial nature of some transactions.92 For instance, Radin is willing to 
accept incomplete commodification in the context of prostitution in order to 
pragmatically deal with the reality that a market for prostitution will continue to 
exist despite bans in a manner that hurts sex workers. However, she fears the 
commodification of such intimacy and wants to inhibit commercialization of 
surrogacy in order to avoid the “domino effect.”93 
Joan Williams and Viviana Zelizer have taken the possibility of incomplete 
commodification and spun it in a more positive light through which they describe 
many transactions that involve both money and intimacy. They have argued for a 
“differentiated ties” view of the commodification of intimacy,94 or, in its most 
recent application by Zelizer, a “connected lives” theory of commodification.95 
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Williams and Zelizer argue that many transactions contain both elements of 
commercialization and non-monetizable intimacy, care or emotional connection.96 
In other words, one could accept money for actions that are at least partially 
motivated by a sense of social connectedness or altruism and perform the job in a 
caring, selfless manner.97 This perspective seeks to recognize both the market and 
caring/selfless aspects of certain endeavors, refusing to see them as mutually 
exclusive: “Instead of living in segregated spheres, people participate in dense 
networks of social relations that intertwine the intimate and economic dimensions 
of life.”98 
In her recent book The Purchase of Intimacy, Viviana Zelizer describes in great 
detail the concept of mixed commodification, which she terms “connected lives,” 
and its wide-ranging applications.99 She explains that conceptual approaches 
towards commodification have taken two diametrically opposed directions: (1) 
“hostile worlds” and (2) “nothing-but.”100 In “hostile worlds” approaches, that 
which is intimate, private, emotional, and built on love and care should not be 
commoditized or in any way allowed into the market.101 As Margaret Radin 
explains, commodification of children, people, body parts, sex, etc., cheapens the 
nature of these beings and attributes, devalues humanity, and thus has serious 
negative effects on the individuals involved and on society at large.102 Those with a 
hostile worlds approach to intimacy argue for a complete disaggregation of intimate 
attributes and the market keeping each in its own separate sphere.103 There is 
opposition to not only surrogate motherhood, but to intimate, personal human 
entities such as children, sex, organs, sperm, eggs, votes, motherly caregiving, and 
wifely housekeeping services. 
In the diametrically opposed “nothing-but” approach, scholars argue that the 
market should be open to just about everything, including children and sex.104 They 
argue that the market is its own best regulator and that keeping intimate objects out 
of the market is not realistic or wise. Rather, the market can attribute appropriate 
values to all commodities and market forces will ensure that they are best 
distributed. As Zelizer explains, “[F]or economic reductionists caring, friendship, 
sexuality, and parent-child relations become special cases of advantage-seeking 
individual choice under conditions of constraint—in short, of economic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. Williams & Zelizer, supra note 94, at 369. 
 97. See Nancy Folbre & Julie A. Nelson, For Love or Money—Or Both?, 14 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 123, 132 (2000) (“One could, of course, let self-interest overtake altruistic concerns 
and do the work in a cold-hearted way, but this not implied a priori. One could, in fact, be 
exceptionally nonmaterialistic and generous.”). 
 98. See Williams & Zelizer, supra note 94, at 366. 
 99. ZELIZER, supra note 95, at 32. 
 100. Id. at 28–32. 
 101. Id. at 22. 
 102. Radin, supra note 10, at 1915–17. 
 103. Maxine Eichner, The Family and the Market—Redux, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
97, 99–102 (2012) (citing MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983)). 
 104. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for 
Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203 (2009); Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 344. 
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rationality.”105 Others, Zelizer argues, believe that everything can be reduced to 
cultural beliefs or political or exploitative bases.106 
According to Zelizer, “People . . . blend intimacy and economic activity [and] 
actively engage[] in constructing and negotiating ‘Connected Lives.’”107 “[P]eople 
create connected lives by differentiating their multiple social ties from each other, 
marking boundaries between those different ties by means of everyday practices, 
sustaining those ties through joint activities (including economic activities), but 
constantly negotiating the exact content of important social ties.”108 Even in the 
most intimate of relationships—between persons in the same household or between 
paramours, there are both economic and intimate aspects to the interactions.109 In 
other words, we are connected to people in many ways, many of which include 
some level of economic connection and intimate, personal connections: plural 
meanings are a constant reality.110 
Indeed, the commercialization of women’s gestational capacity is, descriptively, 
a paradigmatic example of the “connected lives” approach developed by Zelizer. 
First, surrogates describe elements of both monetary and altruistic motivation for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. ZELIZER, supra note 95, at 29. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 22. 
 108. Id. at 32. 
 109. Id. at 33. 
 110. A number of other scholars have made these claims about surrogacy and other 
commodities in the legal context. In a previous article, I have used Zelizer’s theory to argue 
that it is problematic to exclude all paid caregivers, especially foster parents, from the 
possibility of receiving de facto parental status based on the issuing of payment itself. See 
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Money, Caregiving, and Kinship: Should Paid Caregivers Be 
Allowed to Obtain De Facto Parental Status?, 74 MO. L. REV. 25, 55–59 (2009). Such a 
hostile worlds approach fails to acknowledge the important role finances play in raising all 
children and discriminates against the poor and rational minorities who are in more need of 
state funding in order to provide necessary care and live-in nannies who create deep 
emotional ties with children as a way to earn a living. Martha Ertman has argued for a more 
realistic mixed commodification perspective on parenthood markets. While not going so far 
as to argue for full commodification like Posner, she does argue for a regulated market in 
paying for sperm, acknowledging that money does not necessarily corrupt parent-like 
relationships and allows for financial contracts between spouses regarding childcare 
responsibilities. Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?: A New and 
Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 55–59 (2003). Naomi Cahn has 
argued that household work needs to be compensated and that such compensation will not 
corrupt the spousal relationship. Naomi R. Cahn, The Coin of the Realm: Poverty and the 
Commodification of Gendered Labor, 5 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 1 (2001). Similarly, 
Katherine Silbaugh argues for limited commodification of women’s household labor to 
combat the problem of the “cashless woman,” explaining that it is the sales of children and 
sex that are objectionable, not women’s receipt of money for caretaking work. Katherine 
Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s Household Labor, 9 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 81, 
104–07 (1997); see also Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 71–73 
(2002). While conceding that regulation keeping these goods and services from being freely 
marketable remains relevant, Williams and Zelizer argue that banning all payment to impute 
value to such services is neither practical nor desirable. Williams & Zelizer, supra note 94, at 
366–69. 
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engaging in agreements.111 Indeed, most list altruism as the primary motivation for 
becoming a surrogate mother, although there is no doubt that commercial 
surrogates view their acts as work as well and appreciate and expect the 
compensation.112 Second, commercializing gestation involves selling bodily 
functions in an ongoing manner that can be potentially exploitative and devalue the 
non-commercialization of human life. This is because of the intimate nature of 
gestation described above, which leads to intimate relationships and attachments.113 
Third, surrogacy involves the transferring of a human child from one woman’s 
womb to a couple’s arms. The fetus’s needs must be looked after during the 
pregnancy and the children’s needs and interests must be attended to after the birth. 
Mixed commodification allows us to accept that there are multiple identifiable 
purposes for our actions. Thus, altruistic motives do not cancel or encroach on 
monetary fiscal motives. Moreover, the nature of an act can be both deeply 
personal and saleable, and thus the relationship between the surrogate and the 
commissioning couple can be recognized without negating the commercial nature 
of the transaction. 
4. From a Descriptive to a Prescriptive Mixed Commodification Analysis of 
Surrogacy 
Zelizer’s project regarding the nature of intimate relations and intimacy’s 
interaction with the market is largely descriptive.114 In her book, by reviewing a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. Ciccarreli & Beckman, supra note 27, at 29–31 (citing, among others, Hilary 
Hanafin, The Surrogate Mother: An Exploratory Study, in 45 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS 
INTERNATIONAL 3335–36-B (1985)); van den Akker, Experience of Surrogacy, supra note 
35, at 150–51. 
 112. Baslington, supra note 39, at 58, 62–63, 67; Ciccarreli & Beckman, supra note 27, 
at 30 (citing Joan Einwohner, Who Becomes a Surrogate: Personality Characteristics, in 
GENDER IN TRANSITION: A NEW FRONTIER 123, 123–32 (Joan Offerman-Zuckerberg ed., 
1989)) (“40% of women state the fee was their main, although not their only, motivator.”); 
Edelmann, supra note 1, at 128. 
 113. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 114. Zelizer herself, although attesting to making a descriptive argument, pushes this 
boundary as well. ZELIZER, supra note 95, at 297. She concedes, for instance, that the 
otherwise flawed hostile worlds/nothing-but analyses of the relationship between the market 
and intimacy, “zones of intimacy operate according to different rules from other sorts of 
organizations.” Id. at 291. While not going so far as to say that such alternate rules are 
appropriate, it can be inferred. In fact, later she explains that the insistence on “perpetuating 
the myth of inescapable divisions and battles between the worlds of sentiment and 
rationality, of market and domesticity, hostile worlds arguments divert us from real 
solutions.” Id. at 297. She urges scholars to take up her perspective on interconnected lives 
in order to “get the interaction of intimacy and economic activity right.” Id. at 298. Zelizer 
points to some examples of injustices that the failure to recognize mixed commodification or 
connected lives thinking perpetuates: (1) failure to compensate women for household work; 
(2) low pay for caregivers; (3) discrimination against mothers on welfare; and (4) 
prohibitions on child labor that can harm households. Id. at 298. These harms result from 
closing off markets in the intimate sphere entirely. However, she asserts the challenge is to 
refrain from attempts to separate intimacy from economy entirely or to blend them entirely, 
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considerable number of legal cases, Zelizer demonstrates how both intimacy and 
economics are a factor in many interactions. More specifically, she demonstrates 
how the hostile worlds and nothing-but perspectives often expressed in judicial 
opinions miss the complex reality of what transpires between persons. Her basic 
proposition is that, descriptively, “in all social settings, intimate and impersonal 
alike, social ties and economic transactions mingle, as human beings perform 
relational work by matching their personal ties and economic activity.”115 Her 
claim is that intimate relations cannot be separated entirely from the market, but 
they cannot be mixed or confused with pure market transactions either—intimate 
relations often have elements of both and thus can be partly marketable and partly 
unmarketable. 
In this Article, I push Zelizer’s descriptive theory firmly into the realm of the 
prescriptive. Not only do certain transactions contain elements of both intimacy and 
economics, some transactions should be regulated to take into account the intimacy 
and personal nature of relations as well as the economic elements involved. As the 
commercial nature will be governed by the market, regulation should be enacted to 
reflect the intimacy. This is not only to deal with pragmatic realities as described by 
Radin,116 but because that is the normatively best way to deal with sales of intimate 
objects. Markets in intimacy will continue to flow and develop, and such sales can 
be extremely beneficial to participants and to society as a whole and thus should 
not be prohibited. This is the case with surrogacy. But, when significant amounts of 
intimacy are involved, these markets should be regulated and such regulation can 
be justified to recognize the plural nature of such markets.117 
5. Towards a Regulatory Framework for Commercial Surrogacy 
The first question that follows is: what is sufficient intimacy to necessitate 
regulation? Many broad categories of transactions involve some degree of 
intimacy, such as any sale of labor services or the sale of property. Labor and 
property laws do regulate such intimacy to some degree. But such categories entail 
less intimacy then surrogate motherhood because they are more separable from the 
self. I would argue that there are at least three broad categories of intimate 
transactions that are so intimate as to require regulation specifically aimed at 
protecting and recognizing their intimacy: the sale of body parts, the sale of bodily 
functions, and the sale of love—all of which are significantly tied up with the 
self.118 Ultimately, commodification is a matter of degree and not bright line 
                                                                                                                 
but rather to “create fair mixtures. We should stop agonizing over whether or not money 
corrupts, but instead analyze what combinations of economic activity and intimate relations 
produce happier, more just, and more productive lives.” Id. Although admitting that money 
can corrupt, and must be restrained, she urges that we must accept mingling and then 
determine how to resolve mingling in the most productive and appropriate manner. Id. at 
298–99. 
 115. Id. at 288. 
 116. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
 117. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 70, at 494–99 (describing the appropriateness of 
regulation to differentiate intimate markets from other markets). 
 118. See Michele Goodwin, Relational Markets in Intimate Goods, 44 TULSA L. REV. 
803, 805 (2009) (“The dual statuses of intimacy are employed here—both as a metaphor for 
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rules.119 For instance, I would argue that surrogacy is more intimate than egg and 
sperm sales because of the longer bodily and emotional commitment that gestation 
entails and thus more in need of regulation. Others may disagree depending on the 
importance placed on genetics. I am arguing for a pragmatic, context-specific 
approach that takes intimacy seriously, particularly when the intimacy is so 
prevalent that it overwhelms the transaction. But, what distinguishes my 
perspective from an anti-commodification perspective is that I believe that within 
these categories of intimacy a market can flourish in an ethical and legal manner. 
Moreover, my argument is not grudging, accepting commodification because I 
believe it is not preventable;120 rather, I believe that a regulated market that 
recognizes the commercial and intimate aspects of surrogacy transactions is 
befitting and appropriate at least in a domestic market.121 
Regulation is the appropriate response to recognition of plural meanings as it 
provides an intermediate position between a ban and full marketization and 
differentiates intimate markets recognizing the complex nature of such 
transactions.122 Still, a regulatory response to recognizing the relevance of mixed 
commodification is not obvious, although first raised by Radin in her discussion of 
incomplete commodification.123 In the context of surrogacy, Radin nonetheless 
opted for a ban on commercializing gestation.124 Ertman, although recognizing the 
relevance of mixed commodification in intimate markets, uses it to justify the 
mostly free market in donor sperm.125 Both of these positions miss the mark. The 
reason to turn mixed commodification from a descriptive tool to a normative 
framework creating the need for regulation is that it better allows for the benefits of 
surrogacy, while eliminating or minimizing the potential harms. 
Regulation can be carefully drafted to contend with the high levels of intimacy 
involved, as well as the positive benefits marketization provides. On the one hand 
this approach recognizes that there is a cost to full commodification that could 
harm participants and undermine our notions of the sanctity of personhood more 
generally. On the other hand, there is no reason to lose the benefits of markets in 
intimate relationships and in bodily functions because intimacies are frequently 
exchanged for money. Rather, the markets should be harnessed to reap the benefits 
while taking care not to harm the participants and society more broadly. 
                                                                                                                 
relationships and affinity linkages . . . and also as the term relates to the exclusively yours: 
biological goods, such as kidneys, ova, sperm, and babies.”). I add to intimate relationships 
and body parts described as “intimate” by Goodwin the leasing (selling) of bodily functions 
such as gestation. 
 119. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 8, at 422. 
 120. See, e.g., Suter, supra note 82, at 220–21, 232 (describing how she “‘give[s] in’” to 
a baby market despite deep concerns and idealized notions that would favor prohibition of 
baby markets). 
 121. See infra Part II. 
 122. See Hasday, supra note 70, at 528 (“A child is not a commodity and should not be 
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A. Zelizer, From Baby Farms to Baby M, SOCIETY, Mar./Apr. 1988, at 28 (suggesting that 
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 123. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
 125. See Ertman, supra note 110, at 28–35. 
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The question that follows will be discussed at length below: What kind of 
regulation, specifically, may be appropriate in the context of surrogate 
motherhood? Recognizing the regulation may be appropriate only begins the 
conversation. Inappropriate regulation, in fact can do more harm than good to 
markets in intimacy.126 Effective regulation of intimate transactions would 
recognize and protect the intimacy, avoiding to the extent possible the harm it can 
cause to vulnerable parties as well as the damage it can cause to self-perception and 
the non-monetary aspects of personhood generally. Yet, it would also allow the 
market to flourish in a fair and reasonably stable manner. Regulators should 
acknowledge empirically the emotional connections surrogates form with intended 
parents, and potentially the fetus as well.127 Regulation should also acknowledge 
the significant benefits surrogacy has reaped for infertile couples, the general 
satisfaction attested to by all parties and the lack of litigation resulting from the 
vast majority of agreements. 
6. Responding to Criticism of Mixed Commodification 
A number of scholars have argued that mixed commodification as a framework 
for exploring intimate transactions is particularly problematic, perhaps more so 
than full commodification or complete noncommodification. Some legal scholars 
criticize mixed commodification approaches because regulation of intimate markets 
asymmetrically impacts women as most of the taboo trades—surrogacy, 
prostitution, and egg sales—involve women’s labor.128 This argument is of course 
true of complete anti-commodification arguments as well, and even more so 
because such approaches would entirely ban intimate trade. It is not particularly 
surprising that trades involving intimacy and human body parts often, but not 
always, involve women’s work.129 Women have traditionally been pegged with 
much of the caregiving and domestic work that involves intimacy.130 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 126. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 70, at 522 (discussing distributive costs of limiting 
financial compensation for intimate exchanges). 
 127. See infra Parts I.A & I.B.1. 
 128. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1741–42 
(2010) (while admitting that commodification arguments also apply to gender neutral sales 
of organ and to male sperm, she nonetheless argues that the bulk of anti-commodification 
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 129. For instance, the sale of organs. See, e.g., David E. Chapman, Comment, Retailing 
Human Organs Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 393, 405 
(1983) (“[S]ociety should not view the sale of human organs any differently than the sale of 
other necessary commodities such as food, shelter, and medication.”); Shelby E. Robinson, 
Comment, Organs for Sale? An Analysis of Proposed Systems for Compensating Organ 
Providers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1019, 1050 (1999) (arguing that America’s deficit of 
transplantable human organs can be solved through commodification). 
 130. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601(a)(5) (West 2009) (“[D]ue to the nature of the roles of men and 
women in our society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on 
women.”); see Mary Anne Case, Pets or Meat, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1129 (2005). See 
generally Radin, supra note 10 (discussing the interplay between market-inalienability and 
prostitution, baby-selling, and surrogate motherhood, all of which involve the intimate use of 
women’s bodies). 
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disproportionate effect on women also rests on the biological reality that only 
women can gestate babies or produce eggs.131 Increasing gender equality has 
involved men in such domestic jobs as well. Such jobs can be regulated while still 
providing sufficient compensation that values intimacy. Regulation should work to 
protect vulnerability and value intimacy and not work distributive injustice on 
workers involved.132 
More interesting are arguments that mixed commodification is particularly 
problematic for allowing the mixing of money and intimacy in transactions and 
that, as a result, it would be preferable to allow either complete commodification or 
complete noncommodification.133 For instance, Mary Anne Case argues that 
allowing intimacy in commercialization may hurt the employee in the context of 
domestic help.134 She explains that calling domestic help part of the family does not 
come from an egalitarian perspective but one of hierarchy and that pure commercial 
relationships are perhaps more appropriate.135 Similarly, being part of the family 
can harm one’s ability to earn the highest wages possible and undermine one’s 
readiness to make demands in one’s own economic self-interest.136 
But, as Case soon thereafter admits, domestic help also seek and benefit from 
this intimacy and thus it does not appear that she is arguing that mixing is 
avoidable.137 Later, she posits that many employers seem to prefer a more business-
like relationship with employees, even when employees prefer intimacy, but she 
also admits that employers purchase love for their children when they hire 
caregivers.138 The intimate worker—whether domestic laborer or surrogate 
mother—is the more vulnerable party and tends to have less in terms of power and 
material resources.139 Thus, if such a worker prefers a more commercial, less 
intimate relationship, that should be her choice and will be relevant in the 
regulatory framework I propose below as well.140 But it is problematic for 
employers to ignore the sensitivity of the relationship involved and the frequently 
desired recognition of intimacy voiced by the intimate worker.141 
As Case describes it, intimate labor is complicated. Intimacy and 
commercialization create a cloudy, complex dynamic. Ultimately, her description is 
of a mixed, complex system of commodification in domestic labor and the harms 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. Lisa C. Ikemoto, Reproductive Tourism: Equality Concerns in the Global Market 
for Fertility Services, 27 LAW & INEQUALITY 277, 305–07 (2009). 
 132. See Hasday, supra note 70, at 517–22. 
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 134. Case, supra note 130, at 1132–35. 
 135. Id. at 1137–43. 
 136. Id.; see also Pande, supra note 11, at 986–88 (describing how surrogates use 
intimacy to explain why they do not demand more fees). 
 137. Case, supra note 130, at 1139–40. 
 138. Id. at 1136. 
 139. See Parks, supra note 86, at 338–39. 
 140. See infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text. 
 141. See Parks, supra note 86, at 339. 
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that could result from such intimacy to the parties, especially to the employees.142 
Thus her arguments buttress the appropriateness of regulation to contend with such 
vulnerabilities. While intimacy can make the intimate worker vulnerable, 
recognition of this intimacy does not create the vulnerability; it only attempts to 
protect the vulnerable party. 
Kimberly Krawiec criticizes mixed commodification approaches because taboo 
markets are then “tolerated, but not embraced, and this uneasy accommodation 
directly impacts commercial providers of sex, oocytes, and surrogacy.”143 The 
focus of her criticism is on what she perceives as mixed commodification’s 
insistence that women who engage in surrogacy or oocyte sales do so for altruistic 
reasons and not for profit.144 But the mixed commodification argument that Zelizer 
puts forth is more complex than this portrayal—it is not altruism or profit, it is both 
and both should be recognized. 
The profit motive should be recognized as permissible by allowing profitable 
payment and the altruistic, intimate element recognized through regulations that 
protect the parties and provide rights and status to the intimate worker.145 
Regulations created to recognize mixed commodification should not prevent 
women from profiting from their work. Such regulations can give women more 
rights; the ability to rescind agreements and the right to receive counseling. While 
exploitation arguments may weigh in favor of limits on payments in some 
contexts,146 the idea of mixed commodification should be to allow the commercial 
trade, but to put forward regulations that recognize intimacy through giving rights 
and status to the subject of the sale of intimate goods. Indeed, arguments that mixed 
commodification only increases exploitation and stigma are misguided. Regulations 
should increase the status of such workers by giving them recognition and rights 
beyond contractual terms. 
C. Relational Autonomy: Maximizing without Ensuring Autonomy 
Another commonly voiced concern about surrogate motherhood is that it 
exploits poor women who do not have other means of earning money. 
Commentators previously predicted that these contracts would employ poor women 
as an underclass for the privileged.147 Concerns are also expressed that brokers take 
advantage of surrogates and make too much money from the use of the surrogate’s 
body.148 Images of Brave New World149 scenarios in which the rich hire the poor to 
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incubate their children with much sacrifice and little profit abound in reaction to 
surrogacy.150 Empirical research does not bear out this fear in the studies of 
domestic surrogacy in the United States, Europe, and Israel.151 In international 
surrogacy, however, the fears are more substantiated.152 
Still, a decision to become a commercial surrogate, undergoing pregnancy and 
labor for money on behalf of another family, is difficult.153 As described above, 
surrogacy involves the choice to lend one’s body for a considerable duration for the 
purposes of another family and to undergo numerous medical procedures and labor 
for financial remuneration. One’s body, time, and freedom are purchased in an 
extricable manner. Contracts often restrict women’s actions, as does the nature of 
pregnancy itself.154 And, those who broker and organize a surrogate’s services do 
usually still have an advantage over her in terms of resources and information, 
which makes the surrogate more vulnerable.155 There may be many social and 
financial pressures affecting such a decision. Being a surrogate is such a unique 
experience that even if a woman has been pregnant before, perhaps she can never 
be fully aware of the nature of the contract to which she is agreeing.156 
Generally, however, we should be skeptical of exploitation arguments that too 
narrowly focus on women as victims. Many contracts take advantage of the 
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emotional, physical, and pecuniary needs of people willing to do unseemly or 
dangerous things for money. That wealthier people would not agree to be janitors, 
stuntmen, or butchers or that healthy people would not agree to undergo 
experimental therapies does not make agreeing to do such jobs or treatments 
exploitative. On the other hand, some choices are paternalistically limited. Willing 
participants cannot agree to work for less than minimum wage or engage in 
activities that are deemed too dangerous. Selling ones gestational services seems to 
be somewhere in between—more personal, involved, and implicating of bodily 
integrity than housekeeping, but not as potentially harmful as agreeing to undergo 
unproven drug therapies for high levels of compensation. Gestation is a condition, 
not an irreplaceable body part. And, with modern medicine, gestation is no more 
dangerous than many other activities that are legal. Still, it is a commitment of a 
bodily function, long-term and involved, that does not mirror typical jobs.157 Thus, 
there is room to be concerned about the autonomy of the surrogate without 
paternalistically denying her right to engage in their services altogether.158 
Yet, it is too simplistic a question to ask whether such choices are autonomous 
or exploitative. Autonomy is not an all-or-nothing proposition; there are degrees of 
autonomy.159 Autonomy is a worthy goal for all members of society, surrogates 
included, and having the choice to surrogate is part of that goal.160 But not all 
choices that are individually made are truly informed and free.161 Choices are not 
always made individually in accordance with a liberal model of individual rights; 
they are influenced by context and societal and familial pressures.162 These issues 
should be taken into account. And, as discussed above, there are a number of 
factors pointing towards the potential vulnerability and exploitation of a 
surrogate.163 
 “Relational Autonomy” provides an alternative understanding of autonomy that 
acknowledges the many social and contextual constraints and pressures that may be 
placed on choices while simultaneously recognizing that there is value in self-
determination.164 It provides a complex account of autonomy that considers gray 
                                                                                                                 
 
 157. It is worth noting that while I frame issues regarding decisional autonomy as 
concerns regarding exploitation, others have framed such concerns as part of 
commodification concerns. I think separating commodification concerns that involve the 
subject of the transaction from autonomy concerns involving the freedom and knowledge of 
the person making the decision is logical and helpful. Admittedly, the nature of the 
transaction may escalate exploitation concerns, but this does not mean that the two types of 
concerns cannot be considered separately. 
 158. See, e.g., Damelio & Sorensen, supra note 13, at 275 (“[T]he surrogate is vulnerable 
in important ways, but autonomy prevents a ban, and even positively supports the enhanced 
choice that surrogacy contracts make possible.”). 
 159. See id. at 270–71. 
 160. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 8–9 (1989) (“[F]eminists are centrally concerned with freeing 
women to shape our own lives, to define who we (each) are, rather than accepting the 
definition given to us by others (men and male-dominated society, in particular).”). 
 161. See Damelio & Sorensen, supra note 13, at 275. 
 162. See Nedelsky, supra note 160, at 8–10. 
 163. See infra Parts 1.B.1&2. 
 164. See, e.g., GRACE CLEMENT, CARE, AUTONOMY, AND JUSTICE: FEMINISM AND THE 
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areas between full individualistic autonomy and complete coercion. Under the 
normative framework of relational autonomy, relationships with doctors, family, 
friends, community, and society at large are deemed necessary to support 
autonomous choices.165 Relational autonomy takes into account the circumstances 
and conditions under which decisions are made and tries to foster autonomy. 
“Relational selves are inherently social beings that are significantly shaped and 
modified within a web of interconnected (and sometimes conflicting) 
relationships.”166 
The goal of relational autonomy is to maximize and foster autonomy—not to 
ensure it. Under this theory, conditions should be put in place to optimize 
noncoercive and deliberate decision making. Because surrogacy is a process that 
deeply implicates personhood, bodily integrity, potential emotional and physical 
trauma, as well as societal constraints and familial pressures, the law should ensure 
that women who choose to be surrogates are in optimal situations to make such 
choices. The need for regulation is not to deny women their choices or to give them 
complete freedom but to ensure optimal conditions for autonomous decision 
making. Thus, regulations should seek to ensure that women are free from familial 
pressure, not in economic distress and as informed as possible about the process. 
II. REGULATING DOMESTIC SURROGACY 
Due to the potential harms of commodification and exploitation arising from the 
intimacy of surrogacy as discussed above, I have pointed to the need for regulation 
of surrogacy despite the benefits of commercial surrogacy to commissioning 
couples and surrogates and the lack of conflict that usually ensues from such 
agreements. Commercial surrogacy involves both a financial exchange as well as 
an intimate relationship. The potential harms that can result from the vulnerabilities 
and emotional aspects of these relationships should be recognized. Such regulation 
should protect the intimacy from full marketization, fostering a system of surrogacy 
that is both commercial and intimate. Regulations should also acknowledge that the 
sale of gestational services is an involved and long-term intimate commitment and 
ensure that autonomy is supported to the fullest extent possible. 
In considering proper regulation of surrogacy, I will first consider regulation of 
domestic arrangements of surrogacy and, second, the regulation of international 
surrogacy, in which a couple from one country employ the services of a foreign 
                                                                                                                 
ETHIC OF CARE 21–22 (1996); Susan Sherwin, A Relational Approach to Autonomy in Health 
Care, in THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S HEALTH: EXPLORING AGENCY AND AUTONOMY 19, 26–
28 (Susan Sherwin ed., 1998); Glennon, supra note 69, at 151–52; Nedelsky, supra note 160, 
at 14. 
 165. See CLEMENT, supra note 164, at 42–44; Glennon, supra note 69, at 151–52; 
Nedelsky, supra note 160, at 12 (“If we ask ourselves what actually enables people to be 
autonomous, the answer is not isolation, but relationships—with parents, teachers, friends, 
loved ones—that provide the support and guidance necessary for the development and 
experience of autonomy.”); Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
411, 413 (2006) (“The second criticism contends that the autonomy principle, while 
estimable and essential, promotes deleterious attitudes, perhaps principally by underwriting a 
corrosive individualism that alienates people from their family, friends, and physicians.”). 
 166. Sherwin, supra note 164, at 35; see CLEMENT, supra note 164, at 22. 
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surrogate. While international surrogacy warrants its own in-depth examination,167 
I want to comment on domestic and international surrogacy in tandem to 
demonstrate that while domestic surrogacy arrangements can be channeled in a 
manner that recognizes the intimate and commercial aspects involved, under the 
same framework, international surrogacy is much more problematic. In short, it is 
hard to imagine that the intimacy in international surrogacy can be properly valued 
as it has been developed on a model that intends to minimize the personal nature of 
surrogacy. Moreover, the distance involved creates detachment and 
disenfranchisement. 
In this Part, I outline some regulatory steps that can be taken to recognize the 
intimacy of surrogacy while fostering a well-functioning system of domestic 
commercial surrogacy. These proposals are not meant to be exhaustive or, except 
for the first provision, required. The first provision for post-birth contact between 
surrogates and baby at the surrogate’s election within an overall best interests 
framework is the most central and necessary provision. It is also the most unique. 
Essentially, it is this provision that best reflects the complex nature of surrogacy as 
a transaction that is still an intimate relationship. Only by undergirding the 
commercial transaction with a potentially legally enforceable relationship, and 
thereby recognizing the intimate contribution the surrogate provides, does the 
mixed nature of the transaction take shape. The other provisions I suggest are in use 
in many states that regulate surrogacy; they can also be used to recognize intimacy 
and account for the benefits of commerciality. But, under the conceptual 
framework of mixed commodification and relational autonomy, prescriptive 
regulatory measures are a matter of degree and good regulation can of course take 
multiple forms. 
A. Post-Birth Contact Between Surrogates and Baby 
The primary regulatory response that I introduce to reflect the mixed 
commodification and relational autonomy perspectives on commercial surrogacy is 
to provide surrogates with a legally enforceable opportunity for post-birth contact 
with the baby that they gestated. Although such an election would have to be within 
the context of an overall best interests analysis and may not provide for extensive 
or long-lasting visitation, it would give surrogates legally recognizable status as 
more than just a contract worker. Such a provision recognizes the intimate 
relationship the surrogate has with the baby and gives credence to the relationships 
that surrogates tend to build with commissioning families during the surrogate 
process. Moreover, such post-birth contact dignifies the surrogate and her body, 
treating her as more than a means to an end and contends with the surrogate’s 
potential vulnerabilities and the power imbalances that most surrogate 
arrangements entail. 
In this Part, I describe the regulatory framework for the post-birth contact that I 
propose. I then discuss the issue of the legal definition of parenthood which is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 167. See generally Margaret Ryznar, International Commercial Surrogacy and Its 
Parties, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1009 (2010) (describing in depth the nature and effects of 
international surrogacy). 
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directly implicated by this discussion. In giving post-birth contact with the baby to 
surrogates within the context of supporting a regulated system of commercial 
surrogacy, the primary legal parents of the baby are assumed to be the 
commissioning couple, but parental rights are disaggregated and deconstructed in a 
manner that rejects the exclusive binary rights of traditional parenthood and 
embraces a more kin-like, extended, and functional familial structure.168 Thereby, 
the model of surrogate motherhood I introduce parallels the movement in family 
law toward recognition of functional parenthood, the benefits of open adoption and 
more extended, flexible notions of parenthood, custody, and visitation. 
1. The Regulatory Framework 
In adoption law, a birth mother has a right to rescind an agreement for adoption 
after the baby is born.169 This right to rescind gives a mother a right to decide about 
her baby’s fate once a child is born and reflects both the desire to ensure informed 
consent and concerns about commodification and baby selling.170 In adoption law 
the intimacy of motherhood is clear and intuitively respected. 
This right to rescind does not apply in the context of surrogate motherhood, and 
surrogacy is not regulated in the same manner as adoption.171 Based on differing 
definitions of motherhood, the intimacy recognized in surrogacy regulation is 
comparatively less. The distinction is justified due to the lack of genetic affiliation 
between surrogate mother and baby in gestational surrogacy and, in traditional 
surrogacy, due to the difference in intent and, potentially, the genetic relationship 
with the intended father.172 In surrogacy, the baby was created because of the 
surrogate contract whereas in adoption, the baby was created regardless of the 
contract. Still, there could be a commissioned adoption in which the child is 
conceived and born because of the intent to adopt. Under such conditions there 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 
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Parenting, 24 WASH. U. L.J. & POL’Y 47, 74 (2007); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet 
Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form: Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional 
Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 428–35 (2013); Melissa Murray, The Networked 
Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 
385, 394–95 (2008). 
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seventy-two hours after birth); In re Timothy W., 223 Cal. App. 3d 437, 445 (Cal. Ct. App. 
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Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 443 (1996). 
 170. See, e.g., Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical 
Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379, 383 
n.14–15 (1990). 
 171. See, e.g., Kerian, supra note 2, at 118–20, 124–26, 138. 
 172. See infra Part II.B.1 (describing in depth the distinctions between traditional and 
gestational surrogacy). 
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would be a right to rescind despite the intent that the adoptive parents raise the 
child. While gestational surrogacy is different in that there is no genetic tie between 
the gestational mother and the baby, gestation is an important potential indicatory 
of motherhood (as it is for egg donation) and consists of a long-term physical 
attachment with a fetus. Thus, it should be relevant in defining legal motherhood.173 
While the surrogate’s gestation on behalf of a commissioning couple may not 
create full parental rights to exclusively parent a child,174 or a right to rescind 
comparable to adoption, it does create an intimate relationship. In sum, while there 
may be somewhat less intimacy involved in surrogacy than in adoption, there is 
still a high degree of intimate contact between surrogate, fetus, and commissioning 
couple that should not be ignored. 
In recognition of the unavoidable intimacy in surrogacy, when surrogates do 
have trouble detaching from a baby, their needs should be taken into account.175 
Surrogates are potentially vulnerable to control exerted over their bodies in 
surrogate contracts and empirically appear to be the parties that seek recognition 
and continued contact and relationships with commissioning couples and thus are 
vulnerable to the extent commissioning couples do not want such relationships.176 
Empirical studies suggest that emotional attachments and the desire for ongoing 
relationships exist for surrogates due to attachments to the intended family, not just 
the child that was gestated.177 Surrogates, in general, are most satisfied with the 
surrogacy process when such relationships continue and their work is appreciated 
on a human level as well as through financial compensation.178 This research 
demonstrates that many surrogates crave this relationship with intended parents 
because of the familial emotional connections they develop during pregnancy.179 
The legal system should recognize this reality and meet them in the middle with 
legal standing that recognizes their connection to the embryo they carry and to the 
commissioning intended parents with whom they have worked in intimate 
partnership. Although the empirical research focuses on the connection between the 
surrogate and the intended parents, it would be admittedly awkward to force a 
relationship between adults and it is still appropriate that the post-birth contact 
surround the baby as the baby is the source of the relationship around which the 
emotional connections were built. Surrogates have created connections with the 
family and post-birth contact should continue with the family with a focus on the 
baby she birthed. 
In sum, surrogates are not incubators that can be discarded after labor. 
Surrogacy should be regulated to promote a process that is satisfactory to all 
parties, without the surrogate being perceived as a temporary mechanism of aid that 
can be readily discarded once the baby is born. Acknowledging intimacy under the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 173. See supra Part I.B.1; see also sources cited infra note 194. 
 174. As discussed below, I feel that no definitive test can definitively determine exclusive 
parenthood in all situations and before the child is born. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 175. See Parks, supra note 86, at 335–39. 
 176. See supra Part I.A. 
 177. See supra Part I.A. 
 178. See supra Part I.A. 
 179. See supra Part I.A. 
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mixed commodification framework means supporting and recognizing the value of 
these relationships.180 
In addition, practically, as intended parents are reliant on a woman to gestate 
their child, and the woman is subject to the intended parents needs and demands, 
and because a child is born and separated from the laboring mother, warm, 
emotional, kin-like relations are important. Indeed, to the extent that all parties 
agree that a smooth surrogacy process is best, and dissatisfaction and litigation 
should be avoided, the need for good relationships is central as it is the breakdown 
of these relationships that appears to result in conflict.181 
Thus, in the rare circumstances in which a surrogate demands ongoing contact 
with the baby without coming to a mutual agreement with the intended parents in 
the form of ongoing relations, an arrangement of infrequent but potentially ongoing 
visitation that allows the surrogate mother to disconnect from the fetus more slowly 
may be appropriate. Or, if the family can work out a more open relationship, 
multiple parental-child relationships may be securely and safely established to the 
benefit of all involved.182 While some would object that this violates the exclusivity 
and privacy of parenthood, where procreating and raising children involves third 
parties, such exclusivity may not be appropriate.183 With a baby born of artificial 
means in which numerous persons contributed to creating that baby, gestation, as 
well as genetics and intent, may give someone status to seek custody and other 
parental rights.184 But, circumstances should be taken into account because conflict 
between parental figures is not good for a child. Thus, shared parenting can only 
work for parents who want or can accept this kind of arrangement. In the rare but 
possible circumstance of conflict, courts would have to work with the surrogate to 
create an arrangement that would allow her some continuing contact with the baby 
and allow detachment over time.185 Such legal status can be accomplished through 
legal precedent or set forth more clearly through regulation that provides for the 
possibility of ongoing, infrequent visitation by a surrogate who requests such 
rights. 
The implications of this potential for legal status may be to discourage 
surrogacy.186 However, this is unlikely to have a large effect because it will only 
come into play in a very small percentage of cases. In most cases, such ongoing 
contact is fostered regardless of legal obligations.187 And, the possibility of such 
status being imposed legally will likely further encourage such ongoing 
relationships. Bargaining in the shadow of the law, intended parents will be 
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encouraged to permit infrequent visits and foster ongoing warm relations.188 
Moreover, it will encourage gestational surrogacy because women indicate less 
attachment to embryos that do not also carry their genes. It will encourage trusted 
friends or family members to act as surrogates as they may be less likely to cause 
problems. Most importantly, it will encourage warm, kin-like relations between 
intended parents and surrogate mothers even after the birth because such ongoing 
relations are the best way to avoid conflict and promote satisfaction.189 
Regulation that encourages such relationships best reflects the complicated 
nature of surrogacy, which is not fully commodifiable. Such regulation is a way of 
reinforcing a sociological reality and hopefully a mechanism for correcting 
misunderstandings and encouraging protection of vulnerable surrogates by building 
relationships. Of course, if a surrogate is not interested in continued contact, her 
ability to gain such status would be irrelevant and it should certainly not be forced 
upon her if it is unwanted. The goal is to regulate the practice of surrogacy to make 
it more relational and responsive to the human relationships that are actually 
created.190 
Such a relationship-focused regime may seem forced and artificial if legalized 
and not engaged in voluntarily, but it is not unique. Such practice conforms with 
the movement towards open adoption, multiple parentage, de facto parental status, 
and grandparent visitation rights.191 More conceptually, the goal is to make legal 
relationships more reflective of actual relationships and to give more status to those 
vulnerable parties who have traditionally been excluded from legal status despite 
actual investment in children.192 This movement is not only aimed at providing for 
the best interests of children, but also for the sake of vulnerable, intimate workers 
such as caregivers and surrogate mothers.193 The overall vision is for a more 
kinship-based method of caring for children that recognizes the variety of intimacy 
involved in the process. Recognition of intimacy in this manner is new but not 
unprecedented in the literature.194 
2. The Puzzle of Defining Parenthood 
Creating this framework for surrogate motherhood involvement in raising a 
child implicates the captivating question of legally defining parenthood. Although I 
engaged in concerted analysis of this question in my earlier thinking about 
surrogacy,195 I no longer find it to be the seminal question in considering surrogate 
motherhood. That is because there can be no fully satisfactory answer as to who is 
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the exclusive legal mother in surrogate motherhood or even egg donation—the 
genetic mother, the intended mother, or the gestational mother.196 
Both gestation and genetics are important legal indicators of motherhood and 
attempts to choose one over the other are fraught with circular arguments, 
stereotypes, and paternalism. Looking solely to genetics to determine motherhood, 
as the Ohio Court of Common Pleas did in Belsito v. Clark,197 faces two compelling 
problems. First, if in gestational surrogate motherhood genetics determines 
parenthood, then women who receive egg donations should not legally be 
considered mothers of the children they birth. In order to differentiate surrogacy 
from egg donations, courts must rely on intent, which I consider below. Second, 
choosing genetics over gestation as the marker of parenthood ignores a uniquely 
feminine aspect of parenting—gestation.198 Essentially, as fatherhood is defined by 
genetic affiliation, a focus on genetics assumes that motherhood originates from 
genetics as well, despite the more complex manner in which a mother-child 
relationship is formed. Ignoring gestation, a forty week continuous process of 
physical nurturing and complex interdependence,199 fails to recognize an involved 
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and biologically significant process that is uniquely feminine. This focus on 
gestation is not as some critiques have argued because of a belief that women 
“should” gestate their children,200 but rather recognition of the unique and valuable 
contribution of gestation when it is provided.201 
Moreover, attempts to point to intent as creating a legally identifiable 
motherhood relationship at the time of birth cannot legitimately be distinguished 
from simply enforcing contractual agreements. And, enforcing contractual 
agreements regarding motherhood seems to belie notions that such relationships 
should not be bought or sold in the marketplace.202 For instance, in the seminal case 
of Johnson v. Calvert, the court determines motherhood as a matter of nature based 
on intent and not as a matter of contract.203 The court decides that in the context of 
gestational surrogacy where genetics and gestation, the two traditional natural 
indicators of natural motherhood, conflict intent determines natural motherhood.204 
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The court could have said that the contract determined motherhood but declines to 
do so; contractual motherhood would conflict with the court use of the concept of 
“natural.”205 Instead the court creates a category of natural motherhood based on 
intent as derived from the contract.206 But, there is no real logical distinction 
between determining motherhood based on preconception intent and determining 
motherhood based on a contract prepared to detail and certify such intent. The 
discomfort expressed for contracting for parenthood in adoption and surrogacy 
cannot be hidden by the language of intent. Arguably, regulations intended to 
prevent adoption from undermining prohibitions against baby-selling are relevant 
whenever there is a contract for parenting rights and status, including surrogacy. 
While an adoptive baby would have been born regardless of the legal transfer of the 
baby and a baby born of surrogacy is conceived due to the contract, a baby 
conceived through sexual relations for the purpose of adoption would still be 
subject to adoption regulations. 
Intentional arguments for parenthood are also undermined in contexts in which, 
despite agreements, biological donors or surrogate mothers function as parental 
figures. Courts then try to reinvent notions of intent to better reflect practical 
realities. For instance, in the case of K.M. v. E.G., the egg donor, who was also the 
partner of the intended mother, agreed not to lay parental claims to the child in a 
clear and explicit agreement.207 Yet, she raised the child with the intended mother 
after the children were born.208 Courts in such circumstances legitimately do not 
want to deny the genetic mother her attachment to the child.209 Ultimately, when 
intentions break down or when practices do not track contractual intentions, we are 
still left with the biological indicators of genetics and gestation and such affinities 
persist. Although in K.M. the court attempts to differentiate between the 
contractual waiver of parental rights, which is invalidated, and intent to raise the 
children in a joint home, which is adopted as a crucial indicator of parenthood, this 
distinction is hard to decipher.210 And, ultimately, it is the genetic relationship 
added to the joint parenthood that ensued that seems to persuade the court.211 
Indeed, had E.G. waived parental rights and not raised the child with K.M., it is 
highly doubtful she would have succeeded in her parental claim. Intent alone by 
contract is then rejected when other elements such as actual parenting and genetics 
are present. Surrogacy thus creates a puzzle without an easier answer. The bottom 
line is that intent, genetics, gestation, and functional care all matter in determining 
parental ties, and it is difficult and perhaps artificial to separate one out as the 
exclusive indicator of legal parenthood. 
Yet, despite these complexities, ultimately the intended mother and intended 
father almost always raise the child as their own in accordance with a surrogacy or 
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 207. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675–76 (Cal. 2005). 
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 209. See id. at 679. 
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 211. See id. at 679–82. 
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egg donor arrangement. Thus, in the vast majority of instances, the puzzle of 
defining parenthood remains a theoretical concern that need not be resolved. 
Regulatory frameworks can be enacted that circumvent such definitional 
complexities. In the end, however, unless harm to the child is found or exceptional 
circumstances exist, the intentional parents will undertake or, in extreme and rare 
cases, be awarded primary custody in the best interests of the child. The extent to 
which additional parental figures may be allowed to parent is a worthwhile and 
contested inquiry that is relevant in a variety of contexts,212 including surrogacy,213 
but need not prevent surrogacy from happening. Although the surrogate may not be 
awarded parental rights equivalent to those of a formal parent, allowing her some 
continued contact with the baby and commissioning couple may be beneficial and 
necessary to properly reflect the nature of the relationship.214 As discussed above, 
promoting relational bonds between the surrogate, the commissioning couple, and 
the baby born of surrogacy can be a positive and necessary part of the surrogacy 
process.215 
B. Additional Regulatory Provisions Reflecting Mixed Commodification and 
Relational Autonomy 
Having explored and described at length the primary regulatory provision of 
post-birth contact between surrogate and baby that I propose, I will now consider 
other provisions that can be used to reflect the mixed commodification and 
relational autonomy framework for considering surrogacy. Unlike the contact 
provision, these provisions are often already in use by states that regulate 
commercial surrogacy. They may be appropriate but are not all necessary or 
appropriate in any regulatory regime to foster human dignity or autonomy. 
1. Gestational Surrogacy Only 
Since the time of the often cited and discussed case of In re Baby M,216 in which 
a child who was genetically related to the intended father and the surrogate mother 
was born of a surrogate motherhood agreement, the use of surrogate motherhood 
has evolved and now often is used to create children related to both the intended 
mother and father through genetic affiliation.217 Alternately, surrogacy involves an 
                                                                                                                 
 
 212. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 168, at 20–21; Jacobs, supra note 168, at 314–32; 
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egg donor other than the surrogate mother.218 In fact, empirical research indicates 
that more than ninety-five percent of surrogates carry fetuses with genetic material 
that is not their own.219 This process is known as gestational surrogate 
motherhood.220 Most often the egg of the intended mother and the sperm of the 
intended father are combined through the process of in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) 
and then implanted into the womb of the paid surrogate.221 Gestational surrogacy, 
as opposed to traditional surrogacy using artificial insemination by donor (“AID”), 
entails a more invasive medical procedure for both the intended mother (or egg 
donor) and the surrogate.222 The surrogate must have the embryo implanted in her 
uterus, which is a more invasive procedure than artificial insemination.223 When an 
intended mother is also the genetic mother, she undergoes a series of invasive 
procedures in a manner that is significantly different from her passive and 
biologically distant role in traditional surrogacy.224 The intended mother must go 
through hormone treatments, an invasive surgical procedure to extract the eggs, 
general anesthesia, and other medical processes similar to those experienced by a 
woman who undergoes IVF and plans to carry the fetus herself.225 
Having the intended mother physically involved in the process creates a 
different kind of surrogacy procedure where concerns about patriarchy and baby-
selling may be less compelling.226 The emotional and genetic connection and 
investment by the intended mother diminishes the sense that the process is one of 
baby-selling as opposed to reproductive aid. Even when the intended mother is not 
the egg donor—either when surrogacy is used by homosexual couples or when the 
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intended mother cannot or chooses not to use her own eggs—empirical studies 
demonstrate that the added biological distance between the surrogate and the fetus 
assists the surrogate mother in separating herself from the fetus she is carrying.227 
And, traditional surrogates demonstrate more cognitive dissonance regarding their 
beliefs about whose child they are carrying than gestational surrogates who use 
genetics to dissociate as much as possible from the child.228 This greater dissonance 
experienced by traditional surrogates should be avoided if possible because it can 
be an indicator of difficulty in separation.229 Surrogates tend to emphasize the 
genetic connection between the intended mother and the fetus, as well as their own 
lack of relatedness to the fetus. While disconnection between the surrogate and the 
fetus may seem artificial and problematic, demonstrating the sense in which the 
surrogate is selling her body, it also facilitates a process where the surrogate 
becomes less emotionally invested in the fetus and thus more able to dissociate 
from the child after birth.230 
Therefore, a possibility for recognizing the intimate nature of surrogate 
motherhood is to allow only gestational surrogacy. However, preferring gestational 
surrogacy should not be based on essentializing the genetic link and thus permitting 
surrogacy only when the surrogate is not the genetic mother.231 Rather, gestational 
surrogacy may be preferred because, empirically, when the surrogate is not also the 
genetic donor, surrogate mothers indicate that the lack of genetic affiliation helps 
them to distance themselves from the fetuses they carry.232 Many surrogates seem 
to place great importance on genetics as a way to differentiate these pregnancies 
from their own. To the extent that this facilitates the surrogacy process for them, it 
should be acknowledged. 
On the other hand, traditional surrogates do seem to place less weight on 
genetics than gestational surrogates.233 And, women who gestate fetuses created 
with egg donors are likely to minimize the importance of the genetic link. 
Attachment is a matter of degree. Too much should not be made of the difference 
between gestational and traditional surrogacy as traditional surrogates also attest to 
being able to detach from the babies by focusing on the importance of social 
parenthood. While studies indicate greater ease for gestational surrogates, this may 
not be enough to ban traditional surrogacy, perhaps only to prefer gestational 
surrogacy through guidelines or recommendations.234 
                                                                                                                 
 
 227. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text; see also Edelmann, supra note 1, at 
129. 
 228. See van den Akker, Longitudinal Comparison, supra note 37, at 282. 
 229. Id. at 282–83. 
 230. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text. 
 231. For a discussion and description of formal and functional indicators of parenthood, 
see Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 168. 
 232. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra note 37. 
 234. Indeed, only a few studies look to mark the differences between gestational and 
traditional surrogacy. See, e.g., van den Akker, Longitudinal Comparison, supra note 37, at 
282 (indicating some greater difficulty experienced by traditional surrogates but not a 
substantial difference). 
1262 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:1223 
 
2. Psychological Evaluations 
Psychological evaluations of surrogates and intended couples have been 
suggested by legal scholars and mandated by legislation in some, but not all 
jurisdictions where surrogacy is permitted.235 Regardless of regulations, such 
evaluations are a matter of common practice in the commercial surrogacy 
marketplace.236 In the context of such invasive, sensitive, and life-altering 
arrangements, such evaluations are useful to ensure the surrogate and the 
commissioning couple are psychologically fit to undergo such an arrangement. This 
is important not only for the adult parties but for the child born of the arrangement 
as well.237 Psychological evaluations can ensure that surrogates are fit to make such 
a decision and recognize the intimate, transformative, and personal nature of the 
surrogate relationship. While what it means to be psychologically fit for surrogacy 
is amorphous, presumably professionals should be able to provide some threshold 
screening. A surrogate, as well as a commissioning couple, should have reasonable 
expectations and rational beliefs and concerns. All parties should be stable and 
competent. Such evaluations can screen for exploitative arrangements in which 
informed and competent decision making is not present. 
3. Counseling 
Separate and apart from psychological fitness, commissioning couples and 
potential surrogates may be provided with counseling to ensure that they 
understand the complex nature of these arrangements, thereby promoting autonomy 
and avoiding exploitation. These counseling sessions would not be about fitness but 
about informing and counseling, separately, the commissioning couple and the 
surrogate about all the emotional and physical risks and benefits of the 
arrangement.238 Counseling sessions could be informative and discursive, assessing 
and addressing any and all concerns and providing as much information as 
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needed.239 The surrogate could be provided information about the law of her 
jurisdiction and also be given information about other surrogates’ experiences. The 
goal of such counseling would be to decrease the surrogate’s vulnerability, to help 
her make an informed and deliberate choice. 
Counseling sessions could be provided as a matter of course and be mandated by 
legislation. And, for the surrogate, the sessions could be paid for by the 
commissioning couple so as not to make this a hurdle she cannot meet as she is 
undoubtedly the party who is more financially in need.240 Counseling should 
identify familial, economic, and social pressures that may compromise autonomy. 
While counselors likely would not be in the business of disqualifying candidates 
who seem to be under what they consider too much pressure, they can help 
surrogates resolve their dilemmas and make recommendations to both surrogates 
and commissioning couples about the suitability of the arrangements. Many 
surrogacy agencies provide counseling for surrogates voluntarily.241 Studies 
indicate varied levels of satisfaction with counseling, although many find it 
somewhat useful.242 
4. Not First Pregnancy 
Because pregnancy is a unique physiological state, and gestating a fetus and 
then relinquishing the baby once born is likely to be an emotionally trying 
experience, regulation can logically restrict surrogates to those who are not going 
through pregnancy for the first time. It is difficult to imagine that a woman who has 
never been pregnant can appreciate the nature of the agreement. Being able to 
appreciate the nature of what you are contracting for is a matter of degree as 
informed by relational autonomy, but certainly would seem to be enhanced by 
having directly relevant experience to inform the surrogate as to the nature of the 
agreement. Indeed, surrogacy agencies usually do use women who have had 
children before, and perhaps this custom is worthy of regulation.243 
5. Limitations on Financial Compensation 
Because the demand for surrogates is high and the supply relatively low, at least 
within developed countries like Canada, Israel, and some jurisdictions in the United 
States that allow surrogate motherhood, the compensation is increasing at a 
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significant rate.244 And if one wants an arrangement done quickly and without too 
much hassle, brokers and lawyers charge even more.245 
Limiting the price paid to surrogate mothers through regulation (perhaps at a 
rate that reflects the rising Consumer Price Index) can be justified for two reasons. 
First, capping the price reflects the desire to ensure that surrogacy is not fully 
marketized but rather appreciated for its dual function of creating intimate and 
monetary relationships. The surrogacy arrangement should not solely be made 
between those willing to pay the most with those willing to take the least, but in a 
brokered, rational, and regulated way that accounts for the personal intimate bodily 
functions that are involved. Payment should be tendered and profits and bargaining 
contemplated, but regulation should monitor the exchanges. Surrogacy also should 
not be prohibitively expensive in domestic markets because, as I will explain 
below, domestic surrogacy should be preferred as a matter of policy to international 
surrogacy.246 Second, a standard price should be fixed to avoid comparable and 
drastically high prices to induce surrogates to act irresponsibly because there is no 
other way for them to earn so much money. Surrogacy is an emotional and complex 
arrangement and should remain a rational option among others—not the only way 
for a woman to earn extravagant amounts of money quickly. Otherwise, people 
may engage in the process without preparation or proper consideration, and 
disasters could result. 
While a limit on compensation may be advisable in order to prevent exploitation 
and full marketization, mixed commodification arguments should not be used to 
justify compensation limits that eliminate profits or support unpaid surrogacy 
only.247 The goal of mixed commodification is to recognize the market aspects and 
intimate aspects of the transaction. Too often barring or limiting payment is used to 
manage commodification concerns, but there are other more effective means of 
regulating the exchange of intimacy that can better support participants and ensure 
the appropriateness of the exchange as I have delineated in this Article.248 Thus, 
payment should be allowed, and the extent that the work is done for money should 
be appreciated in addition to the extent that intimacy and relationships are also 
involved in the transaction. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 244. The average fee paid to a surrogate in the United States is about $25,000, but overall 
costs are much greater, reaching about $100,000 to $120,000. See, e.g., Lorraine Ali & Raina 
Kelley, The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7, 2008, at 44 (the typical fee 
paid to a surrogate is $20,000 to $25,000); Watson, supra note 150, at 531–32; Pande, supra 
note 58, at 620. 
 245. See Tamara Audi & Arlene Chang, Assembling the Global Baby, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
11, 2010, at C1. 
 246. See infra Part III.B. 
 247. See RADIN, supra note 83, at 137–41 (arguing that due to the high level of intimacy 
involved in surrogacy and surrogate bodies and the extent that this can affect personhood, 
commercial surrogacy should be banned and even unpaid surrogacy). 
 248. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 70, at 528–29 (suggesting that although regulation is 
appropriate for intimate exchanges to limit commercialization, eliminating financial 
compensation too often results in distributive injustice and less “impoverishing” should be 
preferred). 
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In sum, regulatory provisions that recognize intimacy are varied. I have 
suggested a number of provisions that may foster good, commercial relationships. 
Most centrally, allowing a surrogate to maintain a relationship with the 
commissioning family through visitation is likely to empower the surrogate and 
therefore foster parity between the more vulnerable surrogate and the 
commissioning couple, and legally recognize the intimacy that already exists. 
Regulation that encourages gestational surrogacy over traditional surrogacy, either 
through mandatory counseling to that end, easing the process for gestational 
surrogacy, or even by permitting only gestational surrogacy, also recognizes the 
intimacy involved by acknowledging the way in which surrogates use the lack of 
genetic affiliation to help them detach from the child they gestate. Exploitation is 
avoided and autonomy promoted by appropriate psychological evaluations and 
informative counseling sessions as well as by requiring that surrogates have been 
pregnant before. Regulating the price paid to surrogates helps avoid exploitation 
and recognizes intimacy, but such regulations should not undermine a surrogate’s 
ability to make money and to benefit from the process. On the whole, through some 
mix of these provisions and others that recognize the intimacy inherent to 
surrogacy and the potential for exploitation, good regulations can be promulgated 
that promote autonomy and intimate relationships in the context of domestic 
surrogacy. 
III. REGULATING INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY 
International commercial surrogacy is now a commonly used option and 
therefore domestic control over the process is waning. In this Article, the term 
“international surrogacy” refers to the hiring of a surrogate that resides in a country 
that is different from the commissioning parents. Whatever regulations or 
prohibitions are put in place on domestic surrogacy will have limited significance if 
surrogates can be readily hired abroad.249 Couples increasingly hire surrogates to 
carry babies on their behalf in India, Armenia, Panama, and Ukraine.250 The state of 
California with its relatively liberal surrogacy laws is also a destination for 
international surrogacy.251 One of the most popular destinations for hiring 
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surrogates is India, where surrogacy is permitted by law.252 In India surrogate 
motherhood is legal, but unregulated and thus completely governed by the free 
market.253 Business in reproductive tourism is thriving in India, growing at some 
seven percent annually, and is approximated to be a $500 million industry.254 There 
are an estimated 3000 surrogacy clinics in India.255 Current data indicates that 
approximately 2000 children are born to surrogates a year in India.256 Therefore, as 
India is one of the largest and most popular international markets for surrogates and 
the locale where most foreign studies have been conducted, I will focus on India. 
However, the discussion of the distinctions between domestic and international 
surrogacy apply to any surrogacy destination to the extent that such distinctions are 
reflected and are relevant.257 
People use international surrogacy arrangements for at least three main reasons: 
(1) domestic surrogacy is prohibited by law, or it is uncertain that a domestic 
surrogacy contract can be enforced;258 (2) domestic surrogacy is more expensive 
than foreign surrogacy;259 and (3) commissioning couples prefer the restrictive and 
monitored nature of the surrogate process experienced by foreign surrogates.260 
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In this Part, I will demonstrate that under a framework of mixed 
commodification and relational autonomy, regulation that cannot promote a 
mutually beneficial and appropriate system of commercial surrogacy cannot be 
translated abroad to the commissioning of foreign surrogates. The cultural and 
geographical distance between intended parents and surrogates, as well as the 
intentional emphasis on commercialization in lieu of intimacy by those who 
structure international surrogacy, coupled with the greater potential for 
exploitation, make international surrogate transactions much more troubling than 
domestic surrogate relationships. First, I will describe international surrogacy, 
explaining how it is more problematic than domestic surrogacy, and then I will 
begin the conversation about what can be done to discourage foreign surrogacy in 
favor of domestic surrogacy. 
A. Distinguishing Domestic and International Surrogacy 
In this Section, I will describe how domestic and international surrogacy can be 
differentiated; they are not just different locales for surrogacy. Domestic, as 
opposed to foreign, surrogacy is a very different proposition. While my 
descriptions of the differences focus on India, in some ways they are relevant to 
any foreign surrogacy arrangements due to the increased distance, detachment, 
potential for exploitation, and commercialization that I describe. 
1. Conditions of Surrogacy 
Unlike in domestic surrogacy, international surrogates (and the fetus being 
gestated) are supervised by a foreign medical, legal, and cultural system, all of 
which may not compare to the domestic system and therefore may cause 
discomfort and dissociation. Medical care is not necessarily comparable to what is 
expected in the home country, which may cause complications for the surrogate 
and the fetus.261 Women may be subjected to more medical risks in foreign 
jurisdictions that do not meet the same levels of medical care.262 
Moreover, the medical system may be explicitly subject to pressure from the 
surrogacy system in ways not expected or accepted in the domestic jurisdiction of 
the commissioning couple.263 For instance, a number of ethical concerns were 
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raised in a recent incident that resulted in the death of the surrogate.264 The 
surrogate, who was in her eighth month of pregnancy, was brought to the hospital 
in severe distress, and the fetus she was carrying was immediately removed. She 
was then treated for her own medical issues. Apparently, under the terms of most 
surrogacy contracts in India, the surrogate mother and her partner agree that if the 
childbearing woman is injured or diagnosed with a life-threatening disease during 
advanced pregnancy, she is to be “‘sustained with life support equipment to protect 
the fetus viability and insure a healthy birth on the genetic parents’ behalf.’”265 In 
essence, the fetus’s health explicitly comes before the mother’s, although both are 
eventually cared for.266 
In addition, as managed in India, surrogates often live in group homes during 
their pregnancy.267 Their daily activities, food intake, and prenatal medical 
treatment are highly monitored.268 Some clinics allow children to live with 
surrogates; others permit only limited visits with children and prohibit sexual 
intercourse with spouses.269 These highly restrictive conditions have been 
established to ensure fetal safety,270 but also to control the surrogates and ensure 
their docility and compliance with surrogate contracts.271 While this does not raise 
medical concerns, it does raise ethical and legal concerns. The international 
surrogate loses more of her independent humanity than a domestic surrogate would 
and her entire life becomes focused on gestating the child for the commissioning 
couple. As a matter of degree, such control and dehumanization is more troubling 
from the perspective of commodification. It is not only her gestational services that 
are rented while she essentially goes on with her life for the duration of the 
pregnancy, but her entire body is rented out and housed at the cost of the 
commissioning couple. 
Another defining characteristic of international surrogacy is the very high use of 
Cesarean sections (“C-sections”). Natural labor is not a part of the process as 
overseen by supervising doctors.272 Rather, C-sections are performed as a matter of 
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course. This does not provide extra risk to the fetus and may indeed be preferred by 
commissioning parents. However, C-sections may be more risky for the surrogates 
and their nearly automatic use distinguishes the international system from the 
domestic system, where there is no evidence that C-Sections are regularly 
preferred.273 This factor again demonstrates the greater dehumanization and 
medicalization of an intimate relationship that occurs in international surrogacy. 
In addition, there are other indicators of the greater threat of commodification 
that occurs in international surrogacy. Foreign surrogates are uniformly much 
poorer and live very different lives than commissioning couples, exacerbating the 
extent to which, “a rich woman pays a poorer one to carry her child.”274 Surrogates 
may be allowed to see the baby, but they are quickly separated from the baby and 
from the commissioning couple.275 This may seem useful to commissioning 
couples, as they do not need to deal with messy emotions and relationships. The 
greater medicalization and institutionalization of the process in international 
surrogacy reflects a much narrower development of relationships and human 
attachment than in domestic surrogacy. 
On the whole, the conditions of surrogacy as described above are intentionally 
more commercialized and less intimate. Surrogates are largely dehumanized, highly 
controlled and monitored, and discouraged from having any intimate connections 
with the fetus or commissioning couple. Suppression of intimacy, however, does 
not make it disappear, as will be discussed further in the following Section.276 
2. Detachment and Distance 
As can be extracted from the conditions of international surrogacy described 
above, the process of international surrogacy contains considerably more 
detachment and distance between the surrogate and the commissioning couple than 
is experienced in domestic systems of surrogacy. The detachment and distance 
between the surrogate and the commissioning couple is more than just medical and 
experiential post-birth; culturally and socio-economically, the commissioning 
couple and the surrogate are strangers. Unlike in domestic surrogacy, relations 
between commissioning parents and surrogate mothers are distant due to 
geographic and cultural differences. Commissioning couples usually do not meet 
the surrogate until after the child is born, and are completely uninvolved in her 
medical care during pregnancy and with her recovery after the pregnancy.277 The 
relationship is completely contractualized, not personal and intimate as in the 
manner it develops in domestic surrogacy relationships. Commissioning couples 
may prefer the detachment; it may seem as less of a headache and also less 
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complicated.278 In fact, many individuals who use international surrogacy say that 
they prefer the more systematic, professional way that international surrogacy 
works, in which the messy personal involvement is largely avoided.279 
The question is whether and how such detachment is problematic. This distance 
and detachment bend the mixed intimate and commercial nature of the relationship 
discussed above towards being more commercial. Avoiding human relationships 
thereby hides the intimacy involved in surrogacy, as the surrogate nurtures the 
fetus, but does not get to know the commissioning family. As discussed above, the 
intimacy involved in gestation fosters an emotional relationship with the 
commissioning couple when they come into contact with one another. Moreover, 
empirical studies demonstrate the surrogates benefit from the relationship with the 
intended parents and are more content with the experience the better relations are 
with the parents.280 International surrogacy essentially avoids this whole issue. 
Some might argue that this is the more appropriate way for the relationships to 
proceed.281 But, such avoidance is problematic. Many surrogates are likely to suffer 
more from the process personally since surrogates attest to benefitting from the 
relationships in domestic settings. Intimacy as an expression of the intimate work 
the surrogate is performing is more constrained for a foreign surrogate. 
Indeed, in a testimony to the need for intimacy, as well as the natural 
development of intimacy between surrogates and intended parents, interviews with 
surrogates in India demonstrate that foreign surrogates may crave that intimacy. 
Many foreign surrogates emphasize their global sisterly ties with commissioning 
couples, insisting that they will continue to stay in constant contact after the birth 
and even that the intended parents were likely to pay for the surrogate’s children’s 
educational expenses directly out of familial love.282 In interviews, some surrogates 
contended that strict clinic guidelines insisting the baby be removed from the 
surrogate immediately would not be enforced by commissioning couples.283 Some 
of these surrogates went so far as pining for and imagining relationships with the 
couple hiring them.284 They form imagined bonds with intended mothers, referred 
to by some as “sisters” and predict a continued relationship with these women and 
the children that they gestate once the children are born.285 Even when these 
relationships cannot and do not exist, the need for these relationships is still 
personified. Although such relationships may exist, it is almost never really the 
case that they exist in the manner that the surrogates imagine them to be and 
continuing such relationships is logistically very difficult given the cost and legal 
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restrictions of traveling. Moreover, even foreign surrogates describe their activities 
using concepts of “gifts,” if not to the intended couple, then for themselves due to 
the money they are receiving, and consider intended parents their “global sisters.” 
Like surrogates that live closer to the commissioning parents, foreign surrogates 
transfer the intimacy of gestation to their perception of the nature of the surrogate 
relationships.286 The intimacy is hidden and minimized in foreign surrogacy, but it 
is still experienced. Foreign surrogates do not want to see themselves as 
commodified, replaceable wombs, despite their treatment by the clinics.287 
Gestation is intimate by its nature, and in order to avoid problematic levels of 
commodification of vulnerable parties, it is important that such intimacy be given 
an outlet alongside the contractual aspects of the agreement. The mixing of the 
intimate and commercial in international surrogacy may play out differently and the 
intimacy is more contained, but it exists regardless. The outlet for this intimacy 
should not be just in the imagined or experienced worlds of the surrogate, but 
recognized as a central part of the surrogacy relationship. International surrogacy 
transactions do not and cannot legally reflect the intimate and commercial 
complexity of surrogacy and therefore are more problematic. These transactions 
have developed as distant and commercial in a way that domestic systems do not. 
Surrogates cannot benefit with ongoing relationships with commissioning couples. 
The way in which these arrangements devalue personhood by treating women as 
incubators and not as ends in and of themselves is much more pronounced. This 
can have both personal and societal effects. Thus, both on a consequentialist 
empirical basis and an inherent deontological “commodification” basis, 
international surrogacy is both different and more problematic. 
3. Exploitation 
Just as there is a greater threat of harm from commodification, there is also a 
greater threat of exploitation and compromised autonomy of the surrogate. This is 
for two overlapping reasons. First, the fee paid for surrogacy in the international 
arena is quite high compared with other options afforded to women of the lower 
classes who engage in these contracts.288 Apart from other problematic ways of 
earning money, such as drugs or prostitution, there is no comparable way for 
uneducated women in India to earn such large fees.289 The lack of choice facing 
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women is due to the greater socioeconomic disparities between rich and poor, 
greater levels of poverty suffered, and diminished economic mobility.290 In this 
economic climate, these decisions seem much more coercive and pressured than in 
first world countries where women tend to have other choices to support 
themselves.291 Studies of Indian surrogates, in contrast to the domestic studies 
described above,292 demonstrate a very low level of education and economic 
earning power.293 For many, surrogacy is their last resort for feeding and educating 
existing children.294 The supply of surrogates is ample despite stigmatization of the 
enterprise in Indian culture.295 Foreign surrogates themselves attest to this 
economic compulsion caused by the poverty in which the live.296 Though they give 
their consent in the liberal meaning, there is no doubt that these choices are made 
under less than optimal conditions. In such contexts exploitation and compromised 
autonomy are much greater threats. 
Second, the status of women in the countries in which international surrogacy is 
permitted is lower than in the countries of most commissioning couples.297 Men 
may bear undue influence over their wives and female family members, pressuring 
them to earn the money that surrogacy affords.298 The money earned is not 
regularly held in women’s names due to patriarchal family structures.299 As 
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women’s autonomy in general is much more compromised in these geographies, 
one should be more wary of the freedom of contract attaching to women who 
engage in these surrogate arrangements.300 As the nature of selling gestation 
services is more complex than most other engagements, this compromised 
autonomy should be taken seriously in considering whether these arrangements can 
be freely and autonomously chosen. 
4. Race 
A racial or cultural hierarchy is also involved in international surrogate 
motherhood that appears not to be regularly present in domestic surrogacy.301 
Commissioning couples prefer genetic donors from similar racial and/or cultural 
backgrounds, while they are comfortable using surrogates of different races or 
cultures. While the United States is also a destination for gamete donations as well 
as hiring surrogates, the cheaper cost and availability of women in third-world 
countries is increasingly popular.302 These women are wanted for their gestational 
abilities, not for their genetic contributions to procreation. In domestic surrogacy, 
surrogates tend to be of similar cultural and racial backgrounds to commissioning 
couples.303 International surrogates are usually different, darker, and less Western 
than their commissioning couples.304 
This hierarchy of race among those commissioning surrogates, egg donors, and 
surrogates gestating children may be more troubling on commodification and 
exploitation grounds. Such arrangements may seem more like buying lower class 
women’s services as opposed to sharing a relationship with women who provide 
intimate services for commissioning couples. Indeed, Lisa Ikemoto argues that the 
act of hiring foreign, racially different surrogates is an act of hierarchy and 
detachment: “What these stories express is the persistence of a form of racial 
distancing that may make hiring a woman to gestate, give birth to, and give up a 
child psychologically comfortable. It is a post-industrial form of master-servant 
privilege.”305 Given the greater detachment and commercialization involved in 
international surrogacy discussed above, we should be wary of avoiding difficult 
emotional attachments in a potentially racial and hierarchical manner. 
5. Concerns Regarding Nationality 
Another difference between domestic and international surrogacy is that when a 
commissioning couple uses a foreign surrogate, the commissioning couple may 
experience significant hurdles in bringing the baby home and obtaining citizenship 
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for the child.306 Different countries have a variety of rules regarding who is the 
legal mother of a baby born through surrogacy.307 In fact, as I have argued above, 
defining parenthood in the context of surrogacy and other Artificial Reproductive 
Techniques (ART) is a complex and persistent dilemma with multiple answers and 
is difficult to resolve within a jurisdiction, not to mention across a myriad of 
jurisdictions worldwide. As citizenship or nationality is usually tied to parentage, if 
a foreign jurisdiction refuses to recognize the commissioning couple as parents, 
crises may ensue. For instance, in the English case of X & Y, the commissioning 
couple was not considered the legal parents under English law; rather, in 
accordance with British parentage statutes, the Ukrainian surrogate and her 
husband would have to be considered the legal parents.308 In Ukraine, the 
commissioning couple was considered to be the legal parents. Thus, it was not even 
feasible to adopt the child, and the commissioning couple was not able to remain in 
Ukraine. After a protracted legal struggle, the child was allowed to enter the United 
Kingdom on a special decision in the interests of the child, despite legal rules to 
facilitate his citizenship. Even if crises do not ensue, and ultimately the 
commissioning couple finds solutions, the extra bureaucratic struggle and costs do 
differentiate foreign from domestic arrangements. 
Moreover, as the case above illustrates, if any dispute exists, the commissioning 
couple and the baby may become separated by geography and travel visas. If the 
commissioning couple separates and a custody battle ensues or they do not want the 
baby, if the baby has serious disabilities, or if other legal problems arise, the 
geographic distance between commissioning couple and child, as well as the 
problems of nationality, can cause litigation and suffering.309 Indeed, in at least one 
case, a child born to an Indian surrogate was left without parents or citizenship.310 
These complications can make an already complex situation into a labyrinth. 
In sum, on account of these differences, international surrogate motherhood 
raises more concerns than domestic surrogacy. Simply put, the commercialization 
has run rampant in international surrogacy without much regard for the intimacy 
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involved. Practically, foreign surrogates are detached and distant. Recognizing the 
intimacy along with the financial transaction is more difficult. The emotional, 
socioeconomic, and racial distance between commissioning couples and foreign 
surrogates is much more pronounced. Both in the context of commodification and 
exploitation, the problematic nature of international surrogacy makes its use 
morally charged and unpalatable, particularly in comparison with domestic 
surrogacy. 
B. How Domestic Jurisdictions Should React to the More Problematic Nature of 
International Surrogacy 
Given the more problematic nature of international surrogacy evident in these 
differences, the jurisdiction in which the intended parents reside and which will be 
the country of residence of the baby born of international surrogacy are left to 
contemplate how to respond. Ultimately, even appropriate regulation of domestic 
surrogacy will not prevent people from using foreign surrogates. Moreover, if 
domestic regulations are restrictive or supply does not meet demand, then domestic 
citizens will be further incentivized to look abroad when hiring a surrogate.311 
While many have recommended international regulation of international 
surrogacy,312 and such regulation may indeed be appropriate, for various reasons it 
has not occurred and is unlikely to occur anytime in the near future.313 Thus, it is 
left for the local jurisdiction of the intended parents to consider how to respond to 
international surrogacy if they want to disincentivize its use.314 
On the one hand, it is cumbersome to try to affect foreign surrogate 
arrangements. Moreover, since local jurisdictions do not have control over foreign 
residents, it can be argued that it is an inappropriate infraction on sovereignty, even 
if justifiable on ethical and regulatory grounds, to attempt to alter foreign citizens’ 
behaviors.315 For instance, even if a domestic jurisdiction disagrees with foreign 
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labor practices, which its own citizens benefit from in the form of cheaper labor 
and products, states generally leave foreign countries to deal with protecting their 
own citizens.316 One country may try to influence foreign governments to modify 
their labor practices through political means, but domestic jurisdictions generally 
will not pass regulations directed at the employers or prohibit trade in such 
products.317 
However, while foreign surrogacy progresses abroad, which is where the 
contract is signed and the surrogate lives, the jurisdiction of the commissioning 
couple does have some legal control over the process. Babies born of foreign 
surrogacy arrangements are born in the foreign country, and commissioning parents 
then seek travel documents to bring the baby back to the domestic jurisdiction.318 
Moreover, commissioning couples must seek a legal determination from their home 
countries that they are the legal parents of the baby.319 In order for international 
surrogacy to work smoothly, domestic jurisdictions must at a minimum provide for 
these legalities.320 Thus, the jurisdiction of the commissioning couple can choose to 
criminalize the use of foreign surrogates for local citizens or to deny babies born of 
surrogacy citizenship, thereby making the process largely untenable for local 
citizens. 
These options should be rejected. Criminalization or refusing citizenship is 
extremely punitive and affects the children as much as the parents.321 Such 
prohibitions or criminalization can serve to stigmatize children and punish innocent 
children in a manner that fails to protect children’s civil rights.322 Moreover, 
assuming that foreign surrogacy continues despite these regulations, it is very 
problematic not to allow those children to be raised by their intended parents. 
Refusal to let the child into the country seems particularly harsh when they were 
created at the behest of local citizens. The burden on the foreign country also seems 
unfair to that jurisdiction and overly punitive to the baby who may be a genetic 
relation to the intended parents. While this can be said of international adoption as 
well, children who are orphaned in foreign countries are still citizens of that 
                                                                                                                 
countries can raise significant concerns about infringing the other state’s sovereignty). 
 316. See, e.g., Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered 
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401, 403–11 (2001); cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 
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one country should try to regulate a foreign jurisdiction’s labor practices or whether 
international treaties should be enforced; I am only commenting on the customary practice of 
leaving each country to create its own system of labor laws. 
 317. See infra notes 312–14 and accompanying text. But see Shima Baradaran & 
Stephanie Barclay, Fair Trade and Child Labor, 43 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2011) 
(advocating transnational regulation to prevent child labor); Doorey, supra note 315. 
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 319. See Smerdon, supra note 252, at 73–81. 
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country and clearly the responsibility of that country. Moreover, it is possible that 
not all foreign jurisdictions practice surrogacy in a manner that implicates 
problematic levels of commodification or exacerbates exploitation concerns. Thus, 
criminalization may not be appropriate. 
There are other more intermediate options short of criminalization and 
prohibition that could be considered by jurisdictions trying to avoid their citizens’ 
use of foreign surrogates, given the more problematic nature of international 
surrogacy. I explore a few possibilities, which are not intended to be exhaustive. 
Given the more ethically and legally problematic nature of foreign surrogate 
motherhood as described above, local jurisdictions may attempt to find ways to 
encourage the use of domestic surrogacy short of outlawing foreign surrogacy. 
Domestic jurisdictions should take into account that domestic surrogacy is 
preferable on many accounts than foreign surrogacy. Therefore, domestic 
jurisdictions should work to ensure that the domestic system is accessible.323 In 
addition, instead of criminalizing foreign surrogacy or refusing to grant the baby 
born of foreign surrogacy citizenship in the local jurisdiction, domestic 
jurisdictions could fine commissioning families monetarily for using foreign 
surrogates that are not otherwise approved through the system of accreditation 
suggested below.324 This would have the likely effect of disincentivizing foreign 
surrogacy and equalizing the costs of domestic and foreign surrogacy depending on 
the amount of the fine imposed. Thus, commissioning couples would have less of 
an incentive to use foreign surrogates and would hopefully instead use a domestic 
surrogate under a framework that is less ethically and legally problematic. 
Moreover, similar to the way the United States tries to influence foreign labor 
laws, there are “soft law” regulations that use carrot-and-stick policies in the 
context of trade with foreign governments to incentivize them to improve 
conditions in their own countries.325 While international surrogacy is unlikely to 
attract sufficient attention from the general public to influence overall trade policies 
with foreign countries, spreading influence in this context through trade agreements 
has been suggested.326 
Comparable to the manner in which international adoption is regulated in the 
United States for those countries that are signatories to the Hague Convention,327 a 
certification system can be made for surrogacy agencies abroad as they are for 
international adoption agencies.328 When significant problems are found in foreign 
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country adoption, the United States has prevented international adoptions in those 
countries.329 In the context of international surrogacy as well, domestic jurisdictions 
can certify certain countries for surrogacy while disincentivizing international 
surrogacy from other countries.330 This would allow foreign jurisdictions to meet a 
domestic jurisdiction’s determination of minimally acceptable protections and 
procedures in a manner comparable to international adoption.331 It would 
incentivize foreign jurisdictions to meet those standards. This would allow 
domestic jurisdictions to certify foreign surrogacy destinations on a case-by-case 
basis depending on the protections in place in those countries.332 Finally, if 
international law were to regulate surrogacy, a local jurisdiction could sign on to 
such a convention.333 
In the end, it is important to recognize the differences between domestic and 
international surrogacy. Regulators of domestic surrogacy and foreign policy 
makers should deliberate on how to treat international surrogacy in light of the 
problematic conditions involved. 
CONCLUSION 
The benefits to surrogacy are real. History and empirical studies demonstrate the 
benefits, as do the thousands of personal success stories. Litigation is rare and 
general satisfaction is high among both commissioning parents and surrogates. 
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Surrogacy should therefore not be prohibited or suppressed. But, the ongoing 
concerns about surrogacy are also real. Surrogates engage in a delicate bargain: 
selling their bodily capacities and gestating a baby on someone else’s behalf. Their 
bodies are not entirely their own, and the relationships they develop with 
commissioning couples are significant. This intimate bargain creates real fears of 
potential exploitation and commodification of women’s bodies. Surrogates are 
vulnerable to these bargains at the same time that they benefit from them. 
The suggested regulations consider different protections for the surrogates, 
whom I identify as the vulnerable parties. We should care about the vulnerabilities 
of surrogates and their human dignity as well as the effects of commodification on 
society for ethical and practical reasons. A system of surrogacy that takes seriously 
real relationships will avoid conflict and treat people providing useful services 
appropriately and with dignity. While such protections can in theory be waived or 
go unenforced, the regulation will recognize not only the transaction but the 
relationships that develop, raising the status of the surrogates and their work. Such 
efforts to improve the status of surrogates and to better reflect the relationships 
involved in commercial intimacy are comparable to efforts to create a more kin-like 
legal framework for parenthood that better reflects the reality of the way children 
are both created and cared for. 
Given the need to recognize the intimacy while reaping the benefits of 
commerciality in the prescriptive framework for regulating commercial intimacy I 
develop, the move from surrogates who are hired locally, or at least within the 
same country as the commissioning couple, to those living abroad is significant. 
Due to the distinct differences between domestic and international surrogacy, the 
balance that I argue can be achieved in domestic surrogacy between stimulating 
markets and recognizing intimacy cannot be obtained in international surrogacy. 
The intimacy is lost in the geographical and cultural distance. Thus, international 
surrogacy is not just another form of the same surrogate process; it is constitutively 
different and morally and practically more problematic. To the extent possible, it 
should be avoided, and governmental policy should reflect this hierarchy. 
  
